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Work on collective action focuses mainly on the perspective of disadvantaged groups. 
However, the dynamics of social change cannot be fully understood without taking into 
account the reactions of the members of advantaged groups to collective action by low status 
groups. In 10 experiments conducted in four different intergroup contexts (N=1349), we 
examine advantaged groups support for Normative vs Non-normative collective action by 
disadvantaged groups. Experiments 1a to 1e show that normative collective action is 
perceived as more likely to improve the disadvantaged group’s position and that non-
normative collective action is perceived as more damaging to the advantaged group’s social 
image. Also, these differences are due to differences in perceptions of actions violating norms 
of protest and perceptions of protesters as blaming the advantaged group for the inequality. 
Experiments 2a to 3 show that high compared to low identified members of advantaged 
groups distinguish more between types of collective action, showing a greater preference for 
the normative type. Both a mediational design and an experimental-causal-chain design 
(Experiments 3 and 4) show that support among high-identifiers depends more on whether 
collective action damages the high-status group’s social image than on whether it actually 
reduces inequality. Findings suggest that high-status groups’ support for collective action is 
not only shaped by the perceived likelihood of change but also by its potential damage to the 
image of the high-status ingroup. 
Word count: 226 
Keywords: Social inequality, high-status groups, support for collective action, 
normative and non-normative actions 
  




Is Martin Luther King or Malcom X the more acceptable face of protest?  
High status groups’ reactions to low status groups’ collective action  
 
“Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon, which cuts without wounding and ennobles the 
man who wields it.” 
Martin Luther King Jr. 
"We declare our right (…) to be given the rights of a human being in this society, on this 
earth, in this day, which we intend to bring into existence by any means necessary."  
Malcom X 
 
These two quotes illustrate how members from disadvantaged groups might choose 
very different means to challenge discrimination towards Black-Americans. These different 
strategies find a theoretical echo in the distinction between normative and non-normative 
collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; Wright, 2009). 
The present research is the first to date to examine high-status groups’ reactions to normative 
(e.g., demonstrations or strikes) vs. non-normative (e.g., riots or road-blocks) collective 
action initiated by low-status groups. We propose that support from high status groups’ for 
normative and non-normative actions will depend on how commitment to the high-status 
ingroup affects reactions to the perceived consequences of these actions for the ingroup. 
More specifically, perceived consequences of collective action are conceptualized here as the 
extent to which different collective action strategies are perceived to lead to a reduction of 
inequality (through redistribution of resources and privilege) or to a deterioration of the high-
status ingroup’s social image (through the public exposure of illegitimate domination). We 
hypothesize that normative collective action is perceived to lead to more inequality-
reduction, through an increase in outgroup resources, whereas non-normative action is 




perceived as more likely to damage the high-status social image, through the questioning of 
the larger system and the exposure of undeserved privilege of the high-status group. We 
suggest that support for collective action will be determined by the extent to which low and 
high identified members of advantaged groups are sensitive to these expected consequences 
of collective action. 
The recent “boom” in collective action research has focused on predictors of 
engagement in collective action among members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., Tausch et al., 
2011; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 
2004). Some work has examined members of advantaged groups’ willingness to engage in 
collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged (e.g., Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; 
Stewart et al., 2016; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). However, social 
change can only be fully understood when considering not only how high-status groups act in 
the face of inequality but also how they re-act when confronted with low-status groups’ 
inequality-challenging actions (Iyer & Leach, 2009; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Indeed, 
true change is difficult to conceive without the acceptance or even co-option of the 
advantaged (Iyer & Ryan, 2009). It is therefore surprising to see how little attention has been 
paid to reactions to specific collective action strategies from low-status groups among 
advantaged, high-status ones, namely those who have arguably the most to lose with social 
change (for an exception, see Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008).  
Collective Action: The Importance of an Intergroup Perspective 
By definition, low-status groups have little power, resources, and influence to trigger 
the change they desire in their position (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2002). Thus, more 
often than not, low-status groups need to secure support from other sectors of society if they 
want to see social change come about (Hornsey et al., 2006; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; 
Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). This may include attempts to express grievances to 




policy-makers or to shift public opinion to build political pressure (Burstein, 2006; Burstein 
& Linton, 2002). Previous research has examined attempts to influence bystanders (Saab et 
al., 2015), sympathizers (Stewart et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014), and opinion-based 
groups (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). However, there is far less work on 
how collective action by the disadvantaged affects those who would also be directly affected 
by social change – the advantaged (Iyer & Leach, 2009). As high and low status groups are in 
an intergroup relation, collective action by the disadvantaged should be viewed as an 
intergroup struggle with the advantaged (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) who are affected by 
social change in ways different from the disadvantaged (Leach et al., 2002). As Goodman 
(2001, p. 6) nicely puts it: 
There are unequal power relationships that allow one group to benefit at the expense 
of another group. The various ways people name the two sides of this dynamic reflect 
these qualities: oppressor and oppressed, advantaged and disadvantaged, dominant 
and subordinate, agent and target, privileged and marginalized, dominator and 
dominated, majority and minority. 
 
Here, we use the terms high vs low status/power and advantaged vs disadvantaged groups 
interchangeably. We chose these terms as they convey the aspect of intergroup inequality 
without necessarily implying intentional oppression or domination or differences in groups’ 
sizes. 
There are two main reasons why analyzing collective action from this intergroup 
perspective is crucial for understanding social change. First, because of their greater power 
and resources, high-status groups play a major role in the actual effectiveness of collective 
action (Goodman, 2001; Iyer & Leach, 2009). For example, one consequence of the “glass-
ceiling” is that men rather than women are likely to be in positions of power in organizations. 




This makes it more likely for men to possess the means to actually reduce gender 
discrimination in the workplace. High status groups’ support for collective action by low 
status groups can also give credibility to low-status groups’ grievances and change efforts 
which can help convince other sectors of the organization or society (Burstein, 2006; 
Burstein & Linton, 2002; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subasic et al., 2008). 
Second, high-status groups may have the most to lose materially if collective action 
by low-status groups is successful. Thus, unlike bystanders, and other less self-interested 
sectors of the society, high-status groups have more interest in opposing social change so as 
to preserve their advantage (Jackman, 1994; Jackman & Crane, 1986) and maintaining the 
power, resources, and prestige that goes with the high-status position (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999).  
Having said this, analyzing collective action from an intergroup perspective is also 
crucial to understanding that collective action from low-status groups is likely to draw 
attention to the unfair advantage of high-status ones. This can lead to a need by the high-
status group to legitimize their higher status (Iyer & Leach, 2009; Leach et al., 2002). 
Although high-status group members may be sensitive to the predicament of low-status 
individuals (and thus open to the action), this also creates an additional threat to the social 
image of high-status groups, and consequent defensiveness, which may reduce support. We 
argue here that these two motives, interest and social image, are critical in shaping reactions 
to collective action among high-status group members. In the remainder of this section, we 
examine previous research on high-status groups’ support for social change in the absence of 
collective action from low-status groups. 
High-Status Groups’ Support for Social Change 
Previous research shows the very sophisticated and sometimes ironic ways by which 
high-status group members manage to justify and maintain their dominant position (Chow, 




Lowery, & Hogan, 2013; Jackman, 1994; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Taylor 
Phillips & Lowery, 2015). For instance, strategies that have proven powerful in improving 
general attitudes towards disadvantaged groups, such as intergroup contact (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006) will not necessarily generalize to support of policies aimed at reducing 
intergroup inequality (Jackman & Crane, 1986; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; Wright 
& Lubensky, 2009). 
One hierarchy-maintenance strategy is the increased willingness of threatened high-
status group members to provide dependency-oriented help to low-status groups (Halabi, 
Dovidio, & Nadler, 2008; Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009), preferably to 
autonomy-oriented help (Shnabel, Bar-Anan, Kende, Bareket, & Lazar, 2016). In a similar 
vein, feelings of guilt about inequality result in support for reparative policies but not for 
inequality-reduction ones (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Even when it comes to the mere 
perception of intergroup inequalities, high-status group members seem to use denial 
strategies as ways to protect the ingroup’s advantaged position (Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & 
Unzueta, 2014).  
This tendency to oppose inequality-reduction policies seems to be directly linked to a 
“fear of falling” associated with the prospect of losing power or resources (Jetten, Mols, 
Healy, & Spears, 2017; Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015). For example, opposition to 
affirmative action among highly identified White people was found to be stronger when such 
policies were expected to lead to a loss of privilege among Whites (vs. a gain for Blacks; 
Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006). In the same vein, when a minority plight for 
equality was framed in terms of “rights” as compared to causing “distress” or no framing, 
support for empowering policies was reduced and this effect was mediated by an increase in 
zero-sum perceptions, that is, perceptions of loss for high-status groups (Shnabel, Dovidio, & 
Levin, 2016). 




However, a loss of resources is not the only source of threat that high-status groups 
might experience (for a general discussions, see Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002; Scheepers, 
Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2002, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). In addition to resource-related 
motives and (correspondent) threats, we find issues related to the symbolic value of the 
identity of the ingroup (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000). As is the case for resource-related 
threats, threats to the social image ingroup trigger ingroup bias (Bourhis, Giles, Leyens, & 
Tajfel, 1979), outgroup derogation (Branscombe & Wann, 1994) and increase support for 
inequality (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006). Importantly, research on the 
needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) has shown that high-status 
groups profiting from illegitimate advantage are especially likely to experience a threat to 
their moral image (Siem, von Oettingen, Mummendey, & Nadler, 2013). This threat is 
associated to less positive attitudes towards the low-status group and less willingness to 
engage in collective action on behalf of the outgroup (Shnabel, Ullrich, Nadler, Dovidio, & 
Aydin, 2013).  
This concern about the ingroup’s social image or reputation is especially visible 
among highly identified group members (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; 
Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015). Research shows that low and 
high-identifiers react differently to threats to the ingroup’s image (Doosje, Ellemers, & 
Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; van 
Zomeren & Spears, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). 
Whereas low-identifiers are usually more instrumental and motivated by self-interest, high-
identifiers are also concerned with the group’s social image (see also, Jiménez-Moya, Spears, 
Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015; Leach et al., 2008; Packer, 2008). Clearly, this 
research suggests that the level of identification among high-status group members is likely 
to be an important predictor of support for collective action. We argue that social image 




concerns are likely to weigh more in determining support for collective action among highly 
identified high-status group members than among lowly identified ones. 
Normative and Non-Normative Protest: Perceived consequences 
In the present research, we examine the role of self/group interest and social image 
motives on high-status groups’ support for collective action. We propose that one factor 
likely to differentially activate these two concerns among high-status group members varying 
in levels of identification is the type of collective action taken by low-status groups. A central 
prediction is that normative and non-normative collective actions from low-status groups will 
be perceived as likely to lead to different outcomes and that the extent to which these 
outcomes will be experienced as threatening will depend on the level of identification of 
high-status groups members.  
The main conceptual distinction between normative and non-normative actions 
concerns the extent to which actions align with the norms of society. However, this is not to 
say that normative and non-normative protest will not vary in other respects. The multitude of 
terms interchangeably used by scholars to define normative and non-normative protest is a 
clear sign that these concepts overlap on more than one dimension. For example, Piven and 
Cloward (1991) refer within the same paper to normative and non-normative protest as “rule-
conforming” and “rule-violating”, “permissible” and “prohibited”, “conventional” and 
“unconventional”, “nonviolent” and “violent” or “legal” and “illegal”. To some extent, this 
apparent fuzziness is probably due to collective action research often using this distinction as 
a dependent variable (e.g., Tausch, et al., 2011; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015). This leads to a 
higher focus in operationalization of normative and non-normative protest in terms of 
specific behaviors people can engage in. However, it is surely not limited to this issue and it 
is objectively difficult to reduce the distinction between normative and non-normative protest 
to a specific dimension. There is a constellation of dimensions that are virtually inseparable 




of perceptions of normativity of protest, such as perceived legality, violence, extremity, etc. 
This stems from a general negativity effect that behaviors outside the rules of the system are 
likely to trigger. For example, even behaviors that outside the realm of protest are legal and 
commonly accepted, such as going topless on European beaches, get a totally different 
response when inserted into a context of protest. The Femen movement in France in which 
women wrote protest messages on their breasts and stood in museums and churches in silent 
protest come across as extreme, even violent, and lead to arrests.  
Yet, the fact that normative and non-normative protest is likely to co-vary on multiple 
dimensions, in the guise of a “syndrome”, should not prevent us from examining the 
independent contributions of different dimensions for perceptions of normative and non-
normative protest. Specifically, a systematic analysis of current definitions of (non)normative 
collective action highlights two distinct aspects that are, in our opinion, especially worthy of 
attention from scholars trying to understand perceived outcomes of different types of protest.  
The first is the extent to which all members of a superordinate category (i.e., low and 
high-status groups) perceive the action in which low-status groups engage as a normal and 
appropriate way to pursue social change within the system. Put simply, “a riot is clearly not 
an electoral rally, and both the participants and the authorities know the difference” (Piven & 
Cloward, 1991, p. 437). We refer to this aspect as perceived ‘strict normativity’.  
The second concerns more directly the role of the high-status groups in the creation 
and maintenance of inequality. This aspect is closely linked to perceptions that protesters 
engaging in (non)normative protest are “pointing the finger” at the advantaged as responsible 
for the inequality. We refer to this aspect as perceived ‘attributions of blame to the 
advantaged’. We argue that differences between normative and non-normative protest in 
these two dimensions (i.e., ‘strict normativity’ and attributions of blame) are of special 




importance in determining the perceived consequences of protest in terms of outgroup-gain 
and social image damage.  
Normative strategies, following legitimate and accepted channels of protest (at least in 
democratic societies), represent shared societal perceptions of how groups should collectively 
strive to improve their position within the system. Both low and high-status groups should 
perceive them as especially high in ‘strict normativity’. In addition, these actions “provide 
tacit support to the social order” (Wright, 2009, p. 874), that the high-status group embodies 
and supports (Cariati, 2017; Caricati & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2012; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). They should also be unlikely to put the 
high-status in the spotlight as responsible for the inequality. High normativity and low 
attributions of blame to the high-status group should lead to perceptions of these actions as 
likely to be successful in decreasing social inequality by triggering a redistribution of 
resources. We will refer to this perceived consequence of collective action as the “outgroup-
gain” outcome.  
In contrast, non-normative actions are, by definition, not recognized by society as 
acceptable or common means of protest. These actions fall outside the “realm of common and 
acceptable protest”. As such, they question the specific intergroup inequality at stake but also 
the legitimacy of the social order more broadly, and the rules determining intergroup 
differences (Louis, 2009; Piven & Cloward, 1991; Stephen C. Wright, 2009). These low 
perceptions of ‘strict normativity’ of non-normative protest should lead to perceptions of 
non-normative actions as damaging the social image of the high-status group, as responsible 
and supportive of an unfair system of rules. In addition, “participation in non-normative 
actions may require firmer convictions about the injustice/immorality of the high-status 
group’s actions” (Wright, 2009, p. 874).  Groups resorting to non-normative protest 
(compared to normative) are therefore more likely to be perceived as blaming the advantaged 




for the inequality and to direct attention on the high-status group role as perpetrator of 
inequality (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez, & de Weerd, 2002). As a consequence of 
both low perceptions of ‘strict normativity’ and higher perceived attributions of blame to the 
high-status group, non-normative actions should be perceived as more likely to damage the 
social image of the high-status group than to necessarily lead to outgroup-gain for the low-
status group. 
Finally, it is important to clarify that our proposed conceptual model pertaining to the 
consequences of perceptions of likelihood of outgroup-gain and social image damage is one 
in which the type of collective action brings to the foreground one type of concern relative to 
the other. Specifically, we propose that concerns about outgroup gain will take precedence 
over social-image concerns in the case of normative action and vice-versa for non-normative 
action.  
How perceived consequences of normative and non-normative protest shape support: 
the role of ingroup identification  
In order to set the stage for our reasoning concerning support for collective action, it 
is first important to make clear that the extent to which people perceive normative and non-
normative collective action to lead to different outcomes should be consensual among 
different audiences (e.g., advantaged groups or non-involved observers). This should be the 
case because the normativity of protest is a social norm shared by members of the same 
society with respect to the (in)appropriateness of different social change strategies (Piven & 
Cloward, 1991; Wright, 2009). Among members of advantaged groups, there will also be 
consensus around the perceived consequences of normative and non-normative actions. 
However, whereas perceptions of the consequences of collective action should not vary, we 
argue that reactions to these consequences in the form of support should. More specifically, 
support will likely be shaped by how different levels of identification determine sensitivity to 




different perceived consequences of collective action. In other words, the fact that one 
consequence (outgroup-gain vs. social-image damage) is perceived to be more likely than the 
other will trigger different levels of support among high and low identified members of 
advantaged groups.  Importantly, this does not mean that high-status group members are not 
generally concerned with both these outcomes in absolute terms. Indeed, virtually all group 
members (independently of their level of identification or even of their ingroup status) are 
sensitive to the loss of resources or damage to their ingroup’s social image. Moreover, all 
types of collective action likely activate both concerns to different degrees. We therefore 
predict that support for the low-status group’s action should reflect high and low identifiers 
differential sensitivity to the expected outcomes of different collective actions.  
Because high-identifiers are more concerned about their group’s image than low 
identifiers (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), and to the extent that non-normative 
actions are perceived as more of a problem for the high-status ingroup’s social image than for 
the ingroup’s interest, we expect high-identifiers to be relatively less supportive of such non-
normative actions than low-identifiers. For normative action, we do not expect this polarizing 
effect on support to be a function of ingroup identification given that both high and low 
identifiers should be sensitive to material threats to their resources.  
The Present Research and Proposed Model 
We first test hypotheses concerning the perceived outcomes of normative and non-
normative collective action (Experiments 1a to 1e). We predict that different types of actions 
by low-status groups will trigger different expected outcomes. Specifically, normative action 
should be perceived as more likely to actually improve the low-status group’s situation than 
to damage the high-status group’s social image (hence “outgroup gain”). In turn, non-
normative action should be more associated with a social image-damaging outcome than to 




an outgroup-gain one. In other words, we are expecting an interaction between type of 
collective action and perceived outcomes.  
Secondly, we address the specific reasons leading to differences in expected outcomes 
(Experiments 1c to 1e). Normative and non-normative actions are likely to lead to a 
constellation of differences in perceptions of actions, of their consequences and perceptions 
of the protesters involved. Not all these differences should be associated with differential 
consequences of (non)normative actions in terms of outgroup gain and social image damage. 
Of key importance for these outcomes, we argue, is ‘strict normativity´ (i.e., perceptions of 
the extent that the actions infringe social norms of protest at the prescriptive and descriptive 
levels) and ‘attributions of blame to the advantaged’ by the protesters. In this sense, we 
predict that high(low) levels of ´strict normativity´ and low(high) levels of attributions of 
blame to the advantaged explain why (non-)normative actions lead to higher perceptions of 
outgroup gain (social image damage) than of social image damage (outgroup gain). 
Importantly, these differences should not rest on differences in other aspects such as 
perceived violence, extremity, harm, anger from the protesters, and the like, that also 
distinguish perceptions of normative and non-normative collective action.     
Third, we tested the impact of type of collective action on support for low-status 
collective action among high-status group members (Experiments 2a to 4). In this respect, we 
predicted an interaction between ingroup-identification and type of action of the low-status 
group on support for these actions. We predict a negative effect of identification concerning 
support for non-normative protest. No effect of identification should be found on support for 
normative actions.  
Finally, differences in expected outcomes of normative and non-normative actions 
should explain differences in support among high and low-identifiers, reflecting different 




concerns among ingroup members varying in levels of identification (Experiments 3 and 4, 
see Figure 1 for the full hypothesized model).  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized conceptual model of the effects of normative and non-normative low-
status collective action on support among high-status group members and research program.  
 
Experiments 1a & 1b 
We conducted two experiments to examine our hypotheses that normative action is 
more strongly associated with outgroup gain than ingroup social image-damage, whereas 
non-normative action elicits stronger expectations of social image-damage than of outgroup 
gain. As a first step, we conducted Experiment 1a in the absence of a clear intergroup context 
involving collective action. Experiment 1b then went on to present a fictitious collective 
action campaign varying in collective action strategies and tested ingroup identification as a 
potential moderator of the effect of type of action on the perceived outcomes of the action. 






 We presented 44 college students recruited around the university campus (31 women, 
2 missing; Mage=22.35, SD=6,66) with 12 actions that low-status groups in general “can carry 
out in order to reach their goals in a society composed of other, more privileged, groups”. 
According to pre-testing, 6 actions were normative forms of protest (e.g., help to organize at 
participate in a strike, create and circulate a petition) and the other 6 non-normative ones 
(e.g., to graffiti buildings with protest messages, hack websites to let people know about the 
low-status group cause, see Appendix A for the full list of actions). For each action, 
participants estimated on a 7-point scale (1=not at all; 7=very much) the extent to which the 
action aimed at: a) “getting the resources/rights that the low-status group wants” (outgroup 
gain outcome, αnormative=.80; αnon-normative=.58); b) “making people understand that the high-
status group is an oppressor” (social image-damage outcome, αnormative=.75; αnon-normative=.79).  
Results  
 Given the low reliability of the outgroup gain scale for non-normative actions we 
tested our hypotheses using a mixed model in which the 12 actions were crossed with 
perceived outcomes (outgroup gain vs. image damage) and nested within type of action 
(coded 1= normative, -1= non-normative). We included random intercept and random slope 
terms for each participant. Such an analysis takes into account the impact of inter-action 
variability in the determination of our predicted model (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). 
Results showed no main effect of action outcome, B= -.15, t(22.29)= -1.17, p=.254, a main 
effect of action type, B=1.68, t(15.60)= -5.53, p<.001, as well as the predicted  interaction 
between action type and action outcome, B=-1.80, t(37.14)= 4.74, p<.001 (see Figure 2). 
Further probing the interaction revealed that participants perceived normative actions as more 
targeted at outgroup gain (M= 4.94, SD=1.08) than at damaging the high-status group’s 




social image (M= 3.89, SD=1.13), B=1.05, t(36.39)=4.03, p<.001, whereas the opposite held 
for non-normative actions (Moutgroup gain= 2.36, SD=.82; Msocial image-damage= 3.13, SD=1.37), B= 
-.75, t(24.77)=-3.80, p<.001). These results provide initial evidence for our hypothesis that 
normative actions are more strongly associated with outgroup gain than with social image-
damage outcomes whereas the opposite holds for non-normative actions.  
 
Figure 2. Perceived likelihood of outgroup gain and ingroup’s social image damage as a 
function of normative and non-normative collective from low-status groups (Experiment 1a 
on the left and 1b on the right). Vertical bars represent standard errors.  
Experiment 1b 
 In Experiment 1b, we placed participants in a more tangible and realistic intergroup 
situation. Additionally, we tested the potential moderating role of level of identification with 
the ingroup. This is important given that we argue that the impact of identification on support 
for collective action is due to high and low identifiers’ differential sensitivity to (perceived) 
outcomes of different actions and not to the fact that they perceive the actions differently. 
Because the items we used in the previous experiment stressed the actions’ perceived goals 
more than their perceived outcomes, we also reframed them in terms of perceived outcomes.  
Method, procedure, and sample 




We approached 47 Belgian participants (29 women, Mage=21.96, SD=5.20) in various 
university libraries and asked them to participate. After consenting, they received a fictitious 
newspaper article that described a movement of North African citizens of Belgium (an 
important minority in Belgium) in reaction to a survey showing biased hiring procedures that 
discriminate against North African citizens. Specifically, the article stated that a survey by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had revealed that 
five Belgians were hired for each North African worker with the same level of qualifications. 
Such a job discrimination scenario was a realistic and ecologically valid option because there 
had been a lot of media coverage regarding discriminatory hiring practices in which 
employers required recruitment agencies to hire only workers of Belgian origin. The article 
further stated that the “Same qualifications, same job” movement was initiated by North 
African citizens in reaction to these statistics and demanded the creation of affirmative action 
policies in hiring and promotion in order to reduce the gap between these two groups.   
Participants then read two possible endings for the newspaper article describing the 
actions initiated by this movement. As in the previous experiment, type of action was 
therefore manipulated within-participants. In the normative ending, the article portrayed the 
movement as having organized a demonstration in front of the European Parliament in 
Brussels during rush hour and having launched an online petition directed to the Belgian 
political authorities demanding the creation of affirmative action policies in favor of North 
African citizens. In the non-normative ending, the actions of the movement involved 
blocking the entrance of the major recruitment agencies and hacking the main job search 
websites by redirecting any person trying to access these sites to the same online petition 
mentioned in the normative condition.  
Measures  




Ingroup identification. We measure this variable by means of Leach et al.'s (2008) 14-item 
multidimensional identification scale. Participants stated their level of agreement with each 
item on a 7-point scale (1=not at all; 7=very much; example item: “I am glad to be Belgian”; 
α=.87).  
Perceived outcomes of low-status collective action. We measured perceived outgroup gain 
with 3 items adapted from Tausch and colleagues (2011; items: to what extent do you think 
that it is likely that: “North-Africans citizens get what they want”; “successfully argue for 
their rights”; “provoke a change in the situation”; all answers on 7-point scales, 1=not at all 
likely; 7=very likely, αnormative=.87, αnon-normative=.83). We measure perceived social image-
damage with 4 items (items: to what extent do you think that it is likely that: “people wrongly 
think that Belgians discriminate against other groups”; “the image of Belgium is stained”; 
“the Belgians are discredited”; αnormative=.48, αnon-normative=.62).   
Results 
 As in Experiment 1a, the reliability indices were not satisfactory across the four 
scales. We therefore relied on the same mixed model analysis as before to control for inter-
item variability. We entered the 7 items measuring the perceived outcomes (3 for outgroup 
gain and 4 for social-image damage) as random effects nested within type of outcome and 
action. Identification with the advantaged ingroup was entered as continuous predictor at the 
participant level. As before, the model included random effects for intercepts and slopes per 
participant. Results again showed a main effect of action type, B=.61, t(9.02)= 3.68, p<.005), 
as well as the predicted type of action by action outcome interaction, B=-1.49, t(7.73)= -4.67, 
p=.002, (see Figure 2). Importantly, the level of identification did not moderate this 
interaction, B= .29, t(20.28)= 1.04, p=.309. The main effects of identification, B= .02, 
t(33.76)= .14, p=.893, and action outcome, B= .01, t(8.18)= .02, p=.985, did not reach 
significance, and the same was true for the interactions between identification and type of 




action and action outcome, respectively, B= .03, t(23.75)=.19, p=.850; B= .33, t(15.58)= 
1.55, p=.142.   
Probing the two-way interaction between type of action by action outcome revealed 
that participants perceived normative actions as marginally more likely to lead to outgroup 
gain (M= 3.98, SD=1.26) than social image-damage (M= 3.32, SD=1.12), B= .74, 
t(7.33)=2.08, p=.07, whereas the opposite was true for non-normative actions (Moutgroup gain= 
2.62, SD=1.15; Msocial image-damage= 3.25, SD=1.33),B=-.75, t(9.66)=-2.92, p=.016.  
Discussion  
Experiments 1a and 1b provide initial evidence for the first path of our conceptual 
model regarding the perceived consequences of normative and non-normative collective 
actions. Normative collective action was associated with higher likelihood of reducing 
inequality (by improving the disadvantaged group’s situation) than of damaging the high-
status social image. Non-normative actions showed the reverse pattern: they were perceived 
to be more likely to harm the high-status group’ social image than to actually improve the 
low-status group’s situation.  
This pattern was obtained in relatively “empty” contexts (Experiment 1a) as well as 
among members of a high-status group (Experiment 1b). Also, participants’ level of ingroup 
identification did not affect perceived outcomes of actions. Taken together, these results 
suggest the presence of some consensus regarding the predicted outcomes of normative and 
non-normative collective action.  
Concerning normative action, our results align with the defining essence of these 
types of actions, namely that society in general sees them as legitimate means of protesting 
for social change. In this sense, normative actions come across as more likely to fulfill the 
social change goal of improving the low-status group’s position than non-normative ones, at 
least within the confines of the existing system. Our findings are perhaps less obvious with 




respect to non-normative actions. One could expect non-normative actions to be easily 
dismissed as they are beyond the realm of socially appropriate means of protest. Our results 
suggest that this is not the case but that, in line with our rationale, non-normative actions 
stand as a means to highlight (emphasize, draw attention to) unfair oppression more than as a 
way to improve the low-status group position.   
These first results are in line with the prediction that the type of collective action 
affects the extent to which one outcome is perceived to take precedence over the other. This 
is an important aspect of our theoretical reasoning because we argue that: 1) the type of 
collective action determines the extent to which one outcome outweighs the other; 2) the 
perceived relative difference between outgroup-gain and ingroup’s social image-damage 
outcomes shapes the level of support among high-status groups. 
The extent to which a protest action comes across as (non-)normative is likely to elicit 
a series of consequences. In these first two experiments, we limited ourselves to examine the 
basic assumption that actions varying in perceived normativity lead to different perceived 
outcomes in terms of outgroup gain and social image damage. We did not examine which 
specific mechanism triggers the effects on perceived outcomes. Indeed, beyond ‘strict’ 
normativity, (non)normative actions are also likely to differ in aspects such as perceived 
extremity or perceived anger from the protesters. These, and other aspects, are what we 
would call “natural confounds”. However, and importantly, the fact that actions might differ 
on a series of (often related) dimensions does not imply that all aspects are equally relevant 
for perceived outcomes of outgroup gain and social image damage. We conducted three 
experiments to test the predictive role of various aspects on which normative and non-
normative protest might differ on perceived outcomes of collective action and to specify what 
we are the critical factors determining perceived outcomes.  
Experiments 1c, 1d and 1e 




Normative and non-normative actions are likely to vary on several dimensions. In 
general, because non-normative actions are less frequent and negative (at least from the 
advantaged group’s point of view), they are likely to trigger a generalized ‘negativity effect’ 
(Fiske, 1980). This effect should be visible on a number of dimensions. However, the main 
goal here is to examine to what extent these dimensions affect perceived outcomes. Our 
theoretical reasoning around the effects of (non)normative actions on perceived outcomes of 
protest is that there are two main ingredients responsible for this effect. This is of course not 
to say that other dimensions differentiating normative and non-normative protest will not be 
important in predicting people’s reactions. In other words, our predictions are restricted to the 
specific variable analyzed in our research program: perceived outcomes of collective action.  
The first critical aspect that should predict perceived outcomes, is what we will call 
strict normativity.  This aspect refers to the extent to which actions are perceived to fall 
outside the ‘norms of protest’ of the larger societal system, at both the descriptive (i.e., 
frequency) and prescriptive (appropriateness) levels (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Advantaged 
groups are arguably responsible for the system and generally identify with it (e.g., Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). In this sense, (non-normative) actions that question the larger system are likely 
to be seen as damaging the image of those more tightly linked to it. At the same time, 
because they are not normal and acceptable forms of protest, these actions should lead to 
lower perceptions of likelihood of outgroup gain.  
The second predicted active ingredient is perceived attributions of blame to the 
advantaged group. Protesters performing non-normative actions are likely to come across as 
blaming the advantaged for the inequality more than protesters performing normative actions. 
Indeed, non-normative protest clearly is the more difficult choice for protesters and is 
therefore more likely to be a way to emphasize the oppression from the advantaged. In other 
words, in the case of non-normative protest (compared to normative one) the outcome that 




“people will think we have driven them to such a desperate action” becomes more likely than 
“they are going to get benefits with this protest”.  
  We developed three experiments to test these predictions. We measured a series of 
dimensions that differentiate normative and non-normative protest. We designed the first 
experiment to be as abstract as possible in order to avoid any contextual effect, i.e., as a 
“proof of concept”. The second and third experiments aimed at replicating the results in more 
ecological settings by presenting participants with specific inequality contexts to which 
disadvantaged groups reacted with normative vs. non-normative actions. In addition, 
participants’ ingroup was portrayed as the advantaged one. This aspect also allows us to 
examine to what extent results obtained in rather abstract, empty contexts, generalize to more 
concrete ones that explicitly involve participants’ ingroup. In light of the modest reliability of 
the perceived outcomes scales used in the previous experiments, we also changed the items in 
order to secure better measures.  
Experiment 1c 
Method  
We recruited 52 participants from the United Kingdom through Prolific Academic. 
They received £0.85 as compensation. Participants read this short introduction: 
“One way for groups to call attention to their disadvantaged position in 
society compared to other more advantaged groups is to protest. Recent examples 
include Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, Femen, Occupy or the "Yellow Vests". These 
collective protests take different forms. Groups engage in a series of collective 
actions will the goal of improving their situation in society. The actions chosen by 
different disadvantaged groups in different circumstances vary a great deal. In this 
short study, we would like to know how the general population perceives different 
labels of different types of protest (and not the “technical” definitions of such 




protests). With this goal, we ask you to imagine that society has labelled two 
different collective protests. One was labelled: NORMATIVE, a ‘normal’ way to 
protest and the other was labelled NON-NORMATIVE, an ‘unusual’ way to 
protest”.       
They were then given a moment to imagine what these actions might be before 
answering a series of measures about the two types of labels. The questionnaire comprised 
three different logical parts: perceptions of actions, perceptions of protesters, and possible 
consequences of actions. Finally, participants were thanked and re-directed to the Prolific 
Academic website for compensation.  
Measures       
All responses were on 7-point scales (1= not at all likely; 7=extremely likely). 
Perceived harm. Participants stated to what extent each type of action would be 
likely to cause “physical”, “psychological”, “economic” and “material” harm to people 
(αnormative=.75; αnon-normative=.82).  
Perceived legality. Participants stated to what extent each type of action would be 
likely to be considered “a crime” and “civil disobedience” (rnormative=.50; rnon-normative=.58, 
both ps<.001).1 
Perceived extremity/intensity. Participants stated to what extent each type of action 
would be likely to be “violent”, “extreme” and “radical” (αnormative=.71; αnon-normative=.80).  
Perceived normativity. Participants stated to what extent each type of action would 
be likely to be “a common way to protest”, “frequently used by people in general as a way to 
protest”, “approved by society in general as a means of protest” and “perceived as an 
appropriate way to protest by people in general” (αnormative=.70; αnon-normative=.71). 
                                                          
1
 An extra item mentioned “legally sanctioned”. As this item proved very ambiguous, we excluded it from all 
the scales on legality.  




Perceived risk of protesters. Participants stated to what extent protesters involved in 
each type of action would be likely to “suffer physical harm”, “be legally prosecuted” and 
“be putting themselves at risk” (αnormative=.79; αnon-normative=.86). 
Perceived extremity of protesters. Participants stated to what extent protesters 
involved in each type of action would be likely to be “extremists” and “fanatics” 
(rnormative=.74; rnon-normative=.71, both ps<.001). 
Meta-perceptions of protesters. We also measured to what participants thought that 
protesters were likely “to be angry”, “to feel treated unfairly” and “to think the advantaged 
group is to blame for inequality”. These variables were measured with one item each.  
Perceived outcomes of protest. Given the modest reliability scores of these scales in 
Experiments 1a and 1b, we improved this measure (see Appendix B). Participants were to 
indicate the extent to which they thought that each type of action would lead to a series of 
consequences. Six items measured perceptions of the likelihood of actions leading to 
outgroup gain (e.g., “The protesting group will get the results it wants”, “The protesting 
group will be successful in its aims”, “The protesting group will be able to improve the 
situation of the disadvantaged group”). Six items measured perceptions of damage to the 
advantaged group’s social image (e.g., “The protesting group will make the advantaged group 
seem unfair to the rest of the world”, “The protesting group will damage the reputation of the 
advantaged group.”, “People will think that the advantaged group discriminates against 
disadvantaged groups.”; αoutgroup-gain normative=.72; αsocial image damage normative=.89; αoutgroup-gain non-
normative=.83; αsocial image damage non-normative=.84).  
Results and discussion 
Perceptions of “normative” and “non-normative” labels of protest. We started by 
looking at differences between types of protest on the perceptions of actions and protesters. 
To do so, we conducted a series of paired-sample t-tests. Results showed that the two labels 




differed significantly on all measured variables (lowest p=.013) except on the extent to which 
protesters were perceived as angry and as feeling as having been treated unfairly (see Table 
1).  
Table 1. Perceptions of Normative and Non-normative protest (Experiment 1c).  




M (SD)  
Non-Normative 
95% CI t(51) p 
Harmfulness 2.67 (1.08) 4.53 (1.35) -2.37; -1.36 -7.40 <.001 
Legality 2.81 (1.33) 5.28 (1.43) -3.03; -1.91 -8.91 <.001 
Extremity/Intensity 2.97 (1.11) 5.42 (1.22) -2.99; -1.91 -9.12 <.001 
Normativity 5.68 (.98) 2.79 (1.08) 2.42; 3.37 12.26 <.001 
Risky for protesters 2.87 (1.13) 5.21 (1.32) -2.86; -1.82 -8.97 <.001 
Extremity of protesters 3.37 (1.49) 5.13 (1.45) -2.39; -1.14 -5.69 <.001 
Anger of protesters 5.67 (1.40) 5.88 (1.63) -.68; .25 -.91 .366 
Feelings of unfairness of 
protesters 
5.77 (1.50) 5.73 (1.65) -.54; .62 .13 .895 
Protester’s attributions of 
blame to the advantaged 
5.00 (1.60) 5.60 (1.49) -1.06; -.13 -2.57 .013 
 
 
Perceived outcomes of protest. In order to examine the previously found effect of 
type of action on perceived outcomes of protest, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA 
with outcome (outgroup gain vs. social image damage) and type of action (normative vs. non-
normative) as within-participant factors. This analysis showed a main effect of action, F(1, 
51)= 13.10, p=.001, η2= .20, and the predicted outcome by action interaction, F(1, 51)= 
12.00, p=.001, η2= .19). As before, the main effect of action outcome was not significant,  
F(1, 51)= 2.69, p=.109, η2= .05). The interaction revealed that participants did not perceive 




normative actions to lead to outgroup gain (M= 4.11, SD=.90, CI [3.87, 4.36]) more than to 
social image damage, (M= 3.88, SD=1.18, CI [3.54, 4.19]), t(51)=1.01, p=.319, despite the 
means pointing in the predicted direction. In contrast, and as predicted, they considered that 
non-normative actions lead more to social image damage (M= 3.83, SD=1.24, CI [3.46, 
4.14]) than to outgroup gain (M= 3.08, SD=1.18, CI [2.80, 3.38]), t(51)= -3.80, p<.001.  
The main question addressed by this experiment is to what extent differences in the 
perception of actions and protesters predicts the perceived outcomes by type of action 
interaction. To examine this question, we first computed a score corresponding to the 
interaction on perceived outcomes. We first subtracted outgroup gain from social image 
damage for each type of action, and then subtracted these scores for normative from the ones 
for non-normative actions. Secondly, we computed the difference between the scores of 
normative and of non-normative action for all the dimensions that revealed the presence of a 
significant difference between normative and non-normative actions. We then included all 
these predictors in a multiple repression model with the interaction score as our criterion.  
The only significant predictor was the difference in perceived normativity, B=.643, CI [.277; 
1.010], t(44)=3.54, p=.001. The difference in perceived harm and the difference in the extent 
to which the advantaged are to blame were both marginally significant, B=.443, CI [-.085; 
.972], t(44)=1.69, p=.098; B=-.316, CI [-.689; .057], t(44)=-1.71, p=.095, respectively. The 
difference of legality (p=.599), of extremity/intensity of action (p=.865), of extremity of 
protesters (p=.600), and of risk of protesters (p=.338) all failed to reach significance (see 
Table 2).  
In light of these results, we tested a simplified model (see Table 2) in which those 
predictors with p >.10 were excluded, thereby increasing power by reducing degrees of 




freedom. Bayesian information criteria2 (BIC) showed that the simplified model (BIC= 
69.844) describes the data better (given a balance between explained variance and amount of 
model parameters) than the full, more complex one (BIC= 82.394), ∆BIC=12.55. This 
simplified model showed effects of perceived normativity, B=.650, CI [.312; .988], 
t(48)=3.87, p<.001, and the extent to which the advantaged are to blame, B=-.353, CI [-.672; 
-.003], t(48)=-2.22, p=.031. Perceived harm was not significant, B=.209, CI [-.131; .549], 
t(48)=1.23, p=.223. Interestingly, perceived normativity and blaming the advantaged were 
not correlated (r=-.08, p=.584). Taken together, these results provide the first empirical 
evidence for the fact that 1) normativity of protest is a syndrome that involves a series of 
dimensions, that 2) perceived “strict” normativity and blame are the two active ingredients 
explaining the predicted effects on perceived outcomes of actions, and that 3) these two 
variables have independent contributions on perceived outcomes of different types of actions. 
 
Table 2. Full and simplified models of effects of perceptions of collective action on perceived 
outcomes (outgroup gain vs. social image damage) for normative and non-normative action 
(Experiment 1c). 
Difference between Normative and Non-normative actions 
FULL MODEL B t(44) p 95.% CI 
Harmfulness .443 1.69 .098 -.085; .972 
Legality -.125 -.53 .599 -.601; .351 
Extremity/Intensity -.050 -.17 .865 -.643;.542 
Normativity .643 3.54 .001 .277; 1.010 
Risky for protesters -.234 -.97 .338 -.721; .253 
                                                          
2
 A index of model fit (i.e., the BIC) was chosen in this case (compared to the more traditional R square change) 
because our goal was to select the model that describes the data better using a trade-off between goodness of 
fit and complexity in a context where our full model and our restricted model differ a great deal in terms of 
their number of predictors. We chose to use the BIC instead of the AIC because the novelty of the present 
question imposes a more conservative test and the BIC is stricter than the AIC in how it penalizes for the 
inclusion of predictors, therefore reducing the likelihood of over-fitting (i.e., choosing an unnecessary complex 
model).  




Extremity of protesters .092 .53 .600 -.260;.445 
Protester’s attributions of blame to the 
advantaged 
-.316 -1.71 .095 -.689; .057 
SIMPLIFIED MODEL B t(48) p 95.% CI 
Harmfulness .209 1.234 .223 -.131; .549 
Normativity .650 3.866 .000 .312; .988 
Protester’s attributions of blame to the 
advantaged 
-.353 -2.220 .031 -.672; -.033 
 
Experiments 1d & 1e 
Method 
We recruited 302 two participants through Prolific Academic and offered them £0.85 
as compensation. The two experiments varied in terms of the intergroup context used (gender 
and ethnicity, N=147 and N=155, respectively) and the country in which the data was 
collected (United Kingdom and United States, respectively). Participants were members of 
the group portrayed as the advantaged one. This means that they were all men in the gender 
scenario and White Americans in the ethnic one. In both experiments, we presented 
participants with an inequality situation and with two possible responses to the inequality in 
the form of collective protest from the disadvantaged group. These “responses” were 
designed to be conceptually similar across experiments and to reflect normative vs. non-
normative collective action. After reading the information about the inequality and the two 
possible responses, participants answered the dependent variables, were thanked, and re-
directed to the Prolific Academic website for compensation. 
Experiment 1d: Gender inequality scenario and manipulations. 
The disadvantaged group’s action described a collective action performed by the 
alleged feminist movement “Wages for Housework” (WH). The fictitious newspaper article 
reported statistics inspired by a Time-Use report of the OECD Family database  (OECD, 
2011). This article described gender differences in time spent on different activities. The 




main differences between males and females concerned time spent on paid and unpaid work. 
Specifically, participants read: “The main differences concern the relation between “paid” 
and “unpaid” work (i.e. housework) with men being comparatively paid more often than 
women. On average, European men spend 21% of their time performing “paid work” and 8% 
performing “unpaid work”. For women, this pattern reverses with 12.2% of their time being 
spent on paid work and 15.8% on unpaid work. In the United Kingdom these gaps are even 
larger”. They then learned that, in reaction to the results of this survey, British women 
formed the WH movement in order to demand a monetary compensation for the time spent 
performing “unpaid work activities”.  
Finally, participants read the actions performed by the WH campaign. These actions 
constituted our experimental manipulation. In the normative condition, participants read: “At 
home, women had been presenting their partners with a list of tasks they perform regularly 
without being paid and giving them the choice to contribute with a portion of their salary or 
by scheduling a more equal division of these tasks. At work, they had been putting together 
petitions demanding a reduction in work hours for the same pay as men and putting into place 
“work to rule” procedures. In the non-normative condition, the actions involved the “refusal 
to have sexual intercourse with their male partners and the selling of their personal 
possessions, such as gadgets, clothes or books, without informing them (“after all they are 
also ours”). At work, the actions were painting the letter WH on their male colleagues’ cars 
and creating fake Twitter accounts in their CEOs’ names expressing overtly sexist opinions, 
such as “women are a weaker workforce”.  
Experiment 1e: Ethnic inequality scenario and manipulations. 
This scenario was the same as the one used in Experiment 1b. It was only adapted to 
fit an inequality intergroup context between White Americans (the ingroup) and Hispanics 
(the disadvantaged group).  




Measures. All the measures used were similar to Experiment 1c. All presented acceptable 
reliability except for the two items measuring legality (i.e., crime and civil disobedience). 
These two items separately were analyzed separately.   
Results  
Perceptions of “normative” and “non-normative” protest. We started by looking 
at differences between types of protest on perceptions of actions and protesters. To do so, we 
conducted a series of mixed model ANOVAs with type of protest (normative vs. non-
normative) varying within participants and experiment between them (see Table 3). Results 
showed a main effect of type of protest on all measured variables (lowest p=.001) except on 
the extent to which protesters were perceived as angry (p=.148). Furthermore, these 
differences varied as a function of experiment in the case of harm, extremity/intensity, 
normativity, risk of protesters, and the extent to which protesters were perceived to blame the 
advantaged ingroup, and was marginal for perceptions of civil disobedience. These 
significant interactions simply indicate that the gender intergroup context had a stronger 
effect on perceptions of actions than the ethnic one. We take these differences between 
experiments into account in subsequent analyses.  
Table 3. Perceptions of Normative and Non-normative protest (Experiments 1d and 1e).  






F(1, 300) p η
2
 
Harmfulness* 2.38 (1.12) 4.52 (1.46) 502.15 <.001 .63 
Criminal 1.91 (1.18) 5.54 (1.81) 788.10 <.001 .72 
Civil disobedience 
†
 3.17 (1.74) 4.95 (2.00) 142.20 <.001 .32 
Extremity/Intensity
*
 2.54 (1.10) 5.02 (1.46) 623.62 <.001 .68 
Normativity
*
 5.18 (1.41) 2.52 (1.13) 698.14 <.001 .70 
Risky for protesters † 2.50 (1.20) 4.96 (1.50) 623.62 <.001 .68 
Extremity of protesters 2.74 (1.41) 5.44 (1.54) 634.22 <.001 .68 
Anger of protesters 5.05 (1.50) 5.19 (1.91) 2.11 .148 .01 




Feelings of unfairness of 
protesters 
5.17 (1.51) 4.75 (1.99) 19.69 <.001 .06 
Protester’s attributions of 
blame to the advantaged
*
 
4.31 (1.75) 4.67 (2.00) 10.50 .001 .03 
* Effect significantly moderated by Experiment (p<.05).  
† Effect marginally moderated by Experiment (p<.08). 
 
Perceived outcomes of protest. In order to examine the effect of type of action on 
perceived outcomes of protest, we conducted a mixed model ANOVA with outcome 
(outgroup gain vs. social image damage) and type of action (normative vs. non-normative) 
varying within participants and experiment between them. This analysis again showed a main 
effect of action, F(1, 300)= 242.86, p<.001, η2= .45, and the predicted outcome by action 
interaction, F(1, 300)= 187.79, p<.001, η2= .39). Participants perceived normative actions to 
lead to outgroup gain (M= 4.50, SD=1.17, CI [4.36, 4.63]) more than to social image 
damage, (M= 3.83, SD=1.23, CI [3.69, 3.97]), F(1, 300)= 417.63, p<.001, η2= .58. As 
predicted, participants perceived non-normative actions to lead to social image damage (M= 
3.50, SD=1.53, CI [3.33, 3.67]) more than to outgroup gain (M= 2.47, SD=1.18, CI [2.34, 
2.60]), F(1, 300)= 11.97, p=.001, η2= .04. The predicted interaction did not vary as a function 
of experiment, F(1, 300) <1, p=.989, η2<.00.  
As before, we computed a difference score representing the action by perceived 
outcome interaction and a series of difference scores representing differences on the 
measured dimensions as a function of normative and non-normative actions. In addition, we 
computed the interaction terms between these differences and experiment for all the effects 
with p<.10. We entered the score representing the interaction on perceived outcomes as 
criterion, and all the other variables (and interactions) as predictors in a multiple regression 
(see Table 4). Results showed that differences in perceived outcomes of normative and non-
normative actions were significantly predicted by differences in ‘strict normativity, 




perceptions of protesters as blaming the ingroup and, unexpectedly, by the interaction 
between strict normativity perceptions and experiment. The effects of experiment and 
perceptions of protesters as being treated unfairly were marginal.  
As before, we proceeded to compare this to a simplified model (see Table 4) in which 
only predictors with p<.10 were included (i.e., ‘experiment’, normativity, blame, unfairness 
and the interaction between normativity and experiment). Again, Bayesian information 
criteria (BIC) showed that the simplified model (BIC= 421.248) describes the data better than 
the full, more complex one (BIC= 457.103), ∆BIC=35.85. Results from the simplified model 
showed that the only significant predictors of differences in perceived outcomes were strict 
normativity, B=.451, CI [.324; .577], t(296)=7.03, p<.001, perceptions of attributions of 
blame to the ingroup by the protesters, B=-.287, CI [-.406; -.167], t(297)=-4.71, p<.001, and 
experiment, B=-.269, CI [-.495; -.043], t(296)=-2.34, p=.020. Importantly, the interaction 
between normativity and experiment was far from significant (p=.580) and, as before, 
perceptions of attributions of blame to the ingroup and normativity were uncorrelated (r=-
.024, p=.680). These results fully replicate the ones found in Experiment 1c.  
Table 4. Full and simplified models of effects of perceptions of collective action on perceived 
outcomes (outgroup gain vs. social image damage) for normative and non-normative action 
(Experiments 1d and 1e). 
Difference between Normative and Non-normative actions 
FULL MODEL B t(285) p 95.% CI 
Harmfulness -.120 -1.06 .291 -.344; .103 
Criminal -.127 -1.54 .126 -.289; .036 
Civil disobedience  -.008 -.14 .890 -.124; .108 
Extremity/Intensity -.114 -.95 .341 -.349; .121 
Normativity .206 2.40 .017 .037; .375 
Risk of protesters -.054 .528 .665 -.297; .190 
Extremity of protesters .068 -.433 .513 -.136; .272 
Feelings of unfairness of protesters -.119 -1.72 .085 -.256; .017 




Protester’s attributions of blame to the 
advantaged 
-.262 -4.36 <.001 -.381; -.144 
Experiment -.219 -1.87 .063 -.449; .012 
Experiment x Harmfulness  -.185 -1.64 .103 -.408; .038 
Experiment x Civil disobedience .037 .639 .523 -.078; .152 
Experiment x Extremity/Intensity -.006 -.054 .957 -.236; .223 
Experiment x Normativity -.167 -2.04 .043 -.328; -.006 
Experiment x Risk for protesters -.033 -.33 .743 -.232; .166 
Experiment x Protester’s attributions of 
blame to the advantaged 
-.059 -.98 .331 -.178; .060 
SIMPLIFIED MODEL B t(296) p 95.% CI 
Normativity .451 7.03 <.001 .324; .577 
Feelings of unfairness of protesters -.130 -1.89 .060 -.265; .006 
Protester’s attributions of blame to the 
advantaged 
-.287 -4.71 <.001 -.406; -.167 
Experiment -.269 -2.34 .020 -.495; -.043 
Experiment x Normativity -.036 -.555 .580 -.162; .091 
 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c 
Experiments 1a to 1e tested the first assumption of our proposed model, namely that 
different types of collective action evoke different outcomes. In a second set of experiments, 
we aimed at testing our main prediction regarding the interactive influence of type of 
collective action of the low-status group and level of identification with the high-status group 
on support for collective action. In addition, we wanted to rule-out alternative accounts for 
the predicted effects.  
This is the first research addressing reactions of high-status groups to different types 
of collective action in a clear intergroup context implying power struggles. Given the absence 
of literature on this issue, we decided to take a multi-sample and multi-group approach to 
generalize results across intergroup contexts. This approach fits well with the growing spirit 
of cumulative knowledge in psychology (e.g., Cumming, 2014; Curran & Hussong, 2009). 




Specifically, we started by testing our hypotheses across three samples in two countries using 
two different intergroup contexts.  
General Method and Procedure  
Participants agreed to take part in an on-line study on reactions to collective events. 
After participants consented, they read a broad summary of the tasks they were to perform 
and completed the ingroup identification measure. They were then randomly assigned to one 
of two experimental conditions, depending on whether the low-status group had allegedly 
carried out normative or non-normative collective action. All the actions were adapted from 
the pre-tested actions used in Experiment 1a (see Appendix A).  
In all three experiments, we embedded the experimental manipulation in a fictitious 
article of one of the main newspapers in participants’ countries. Participants read about 
disadvantages between their group (the high-status group) and another, low-status, group. 
The article further described a collective protest movement launched by the low-status group 
demanding social change and social equality. Finally, a description followed with the actions 
already carried out by this movement and constituted our experimental manipulation. In the 
normative condition, participants read that the low-status group had relied on legally 
recognized forms of protest such as strikes or distribution of petitions. In the non-normative 
condition, these actions involved illegal actions such as hacking or blocking roads. Our 
manipulation of non-normative actions excluded forms of physical violence because this goes 
beyond non-normative action and possibly into extreme or radical actions associated with 
stereotypes of certain groups. There is evidence that violent and non-violent forms of non-
normative collective action are perceived differently (Saab, Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; 
Tausch et al., 2011).  
After reading the newspaper article, participants wrote their impressions about it and 
completed the dependent measures. We randomized the order of items within each scale. 




Because the main goal of these experiments was to test effects on support for collection 
action, participants answered the outgroup support measure before any other measures. We 
opted not to measure our predicted mediator in this first set of experiments in order to capture 
individuals’ spontaneous reactions and to avoid leading them to think about the expected 
outcomes of the action, as this could artificially trigger the predicted pattern of responses. 
After answering all dependent measures and demographics, participants were debriefed. They 
also had the opportunity to contact the researcher in charge if they had any queries.  
Experiment 2a: sample and procedure. We invited 92 Portuguese men (Mage=41.40, 
SD=11.25) to participate in our study either via Facebook or by sending them the link to our 
questionnaire via their email address that they left at their barbershop. This recruitment 
procedure allowed us to target a heterogeneous sample.3 Two participants failed to answer 
our dependent measure (Nnormative condition=40; Nnon-normative condition=50). The experimental 
scenario and manipulations were the same as the one used in Experiment 1d (i.e., gender-
based). 
Experiment 2b: sample and procedure. We relied on the same general procedure as 
in Experiment 2a with the exception that the intergroup context was the same as in 
Experiment 1b, that is, the low-status group was citizens of North-African origin in Belgium. 
The fictitious newspaper article described the same movement and actions as in Experiment 
1b (Nnormative condition=67; Nnon-normative condition=67). We contacted 133 Belgian university 
students (Mage=21.53, SD=2.67, 106 women, 1 missing) via a Facebook group dedicated to 
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we originally had three experimental conditions: a normative, a mixed, and a non-normative one. The 
mixed condition portrayed both normative and non-normative actions and was included for 
exploratory purposes.  




announcing experiments in psychology and informed them that they would be part of a 
lottery in which they could win 20 euro in exchange for their participation.  
Experiment 2c: sample and procedure. We used the same procedure and scenario 
as in Experiments 1b and 2b. Participants were 163 Belgian political sciences students 
(Mage=22.01, SD=3.49, 108 women, 2 missing) who received the link for the experiment 
through a student mailing list and were compensated in the same way as in Experiment 2b 
(Nnormative condition=80; Nnon-normative condition=83). Experiment 2c only differed from 2b in 
terms of the type of sample. 
Measures4  
Unless stated otherwise all variables were answered on 7-point scales. 
Ingroup identification. We measured ingroup identification with men or Belgians 
(depending on the intergroup context) by means of Leach et al.'s (2008) scale before 
presenting the experimental scenario (αExperiment 2a =.87; αExperiment 2b=.92; αExperiment 2c=.93). 
Support for outgroup’s collective action. This variable represented our main 
dependent variable. The scale comprised 10 items in Experiment 2a and 11 items in 
Experiments 2b and 2c. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with a series of 
statements involving attitudinal support and behavioral support intentions (see Appendix C). 
Sample items include: “I support [the low-status group] in their claims”, “I encourage [the 
low-status group] to fight for its rights”, “I would sign a petition in favor of the [low-status 
group movement]”, “ I would join a demonstration supporting the cause of the [low-status 
group]”; “Paint/Keep watch while somebody paints the motto of the [low-status group] on the 
                                                          
4
 Other measures were included in all the experiments reported in the present article. They were 
included for exploratory purposes and are not the focus of the present research nor affect the reported 
results. More information is available upon request to the first author.  




cars of authorities responsible by labor laws/on the walls of recruitment agencies” (αExperiment 
2a =.87; αExperiment 2b=.91; αExperiment 2c=.88).  
A series of principal axis factor analyses with oblique rotation systematically revealed 
the presence of two factors corresponding to attitudinal support and behavioral intentions. 
The two factors were highly correlated (rs= .67, .64 and .57, for Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c 
respectively) and reliability for scales involving all the items was very good. We therefore 
decided to compute a general index of support that include all the items designed to assess 
this variable. We however systematically checked whether the results varied as a function of 
the type of index, that is, attitudes and behavioral intentions (see Results sections). The items 
slightly varied across experiments. 
Alternative accounts. We argue that normative and non-normative collective actions 
are perceived as having different relative outcomes (outgroup gain vs. ingroup social image-
damage) and that, compared to low-identifiers, high-identifiers are relatively more sensitive 
to image concerns than to status/resource loss. The combination of these phenomena leads 
these two types of members to respond differently to the different types of actions. Before 
directly testing this explanation, we examined two alternative accounts to the predicted 
mechanism.   
Subtyping of protesters. An alternative account for predicted effect is that high-
identifiers’ lower support is due to the fact that they (more so than low-identifiers) engage in 
dismissive strategies when confronted with extreme behaviors from low-status groups. One 
of these strategies is to pathologize (or over-exclude) low-status group members involved in 
non-normative actions. If this is the case, subtyping of protesters should be especially high in 
the non-normative condition and among high-identifiers. In other words, high-identifiers 
should perceive protesters in the non-normative condition as being not representative of the 
low-status group and depict them as extremist and deviant. This subtyping strategy would 




justify less support in this condition among high-identifiers. We therefore measured 
subtyping with 4 items (e.g., “to what extent do you agree with the fact that the people 
involved in the [low status movement] are: “representative of the general group they belong 
to”; “have a lot in common with the general group they belong to”; αExperiment 2a =.91; 
αExperiment 2b=.91; αExperiment 2c=.87). For ease of interpretation, we reversed scores so that 
higher values indicate more subtyping. 
Perceived legitimacy of the low-status movement. Another alternative explanation of 
the pattern of results obtained on support rests on the idea that high-identifiers (more so than 
low-identifiers) downgrade the legitimacy of non-normative collective action given that these 
strategies of protest deviate from societal norms upheld by the high-status group. This de-
legitimization would justify less support from high-identifiers in the non-normative 
condition. Participants stated to what extent they thought that the low-status movement was 
fair, reasonable, and legitimate. We also added the item ‘justified’ to Experiments 2b and 2c. 
Reliability scores were good in all samples (αExperiment 2a =.94; αExperiment 2b=.85; αExperiment 
2c=.89). 
Results  
We analyzed the data using an Integrative Data Analysis procedure (Curran & 
Hussong, 2009). We thus merged the data of the three experiments which secured a final 
sample of 383 participants after removal of missing values (Nnormative=186; Nnon-normative=197; 
Msupport= 3.55; SD=1.19). Unless stated otherwise, we conducted all analyses using multiple 
regression with outgroup action (-1=non-normative; 1=normative), identification (mean-
centered), and experiment (2 orthogonal contrasts representing the 3 experiments ) as well as 
all interactions between these variables as predictors. 
Support for outgroup’s collective action. Analyses on support showed the predicted 
interaction between outgroup action and level of identification with the high-status group; 




B=.126, CI [.004; .249], t(371)=-2.03, p=.043. No other effects reached significance (lowest 
p=.38). Importantly, our predicted interaction did not vary as a function of the experiment 
(see Supplemental material S1 for the full model). We therefore conducted the remainder of 
the analyses excluding the contrasts representing different experiments. Doing so did not 
affect the significance of the critical interaction, B=.133, CI [.021; .245], t(380)=2.34, 
p=.020, (see Figure 3).5   
To probe the outgroup action by identification interaction, we looked at the effect of 
action for high (+1SD) and low identifiers (-1SD). As predicted, high identifiers supported 
the normative more than the non-normative action, B=.193, CI [.024; .362], t(380)=2.25, 
p=.025. Among low identifiers, the effect of type of action did not reach significance, B=-
.093, CI [-.263; .077], t(380)=-1.07, p=.283. Looking at the data the other way around, 
identification had a non-significant positive impact on ingroup members’ outgroup support in 
the normative condition, B=.141, CI [-.027; .310], t(380)=1.65, p=.100, whereas it tended to 
decrease support in the non-normative one, B=-.125, CI [-.272; .023], t(380)=-1.67, p=.097. 
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 A repeated measures ANOVA with the attitudinal vs. the behavioral intentions indexes of support as 
within-participant factor confirmed that type of index did not moderate the critical interaction (p= 
.64). 





Figure 3. Support for low-status collective action among high-status groups as a function of 
the type of outgroup action and the level of ingroup identification in the merged data of 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c (grey areas around the slopes represent standard errors). 
 
Alternative accounts. Perceptions of the outgroup: Subtyping of protesters. A 
multiple regression analysis using subtyping as our criterion only revealed a main positive 
effect of identification (B=.168, CI [.028; .308], t(371)=2.36, p=.019) and a significant effect 
of the second contrast for experiment (B=.205, CI [.045; .364], t(371)=-2.52, p=.012). No 
other effects reached significance (lowest p=.131, see Supplemental material S2 for the full 
model). Moreover, including subtyping and its interaction with type of action in the analysis 
on support did not change the critical interaction, B=.149, CI [.036; .261], t(369)=2.60, 
p=.010. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that subtyping fails to provide an 
(alternative) explanation for the differential support for the low-status collective action that 
we observed between the low- and high-identifiers.  
Perceptions of the collective action: legitimacy of the low-status campaign. The 
present data suggests that this strategy does not seem to operate. First, and most importantly, 
identification did not affect the perceived legitimacy of the collective movement, B=.042, CI 
[-.204; .121], t(371)=-.504, p=.615. Secondly, the interaction between type of action and 




identification on legitimacy of the collective action clearly failed to reach significance, 
B=.108, CI [-.054; .270], t(371)=1.31, p=.191 (see Supplemental material S2 for the full 
model).  
Discussion 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c showed that support of high-status groups for collective 
action was a function of both the high-status group members’ level of identification with their 
ingroup and the type of action carried out by the low-status group. In line with predictions, 
high-identifiers supported normative outgroup actions more than non-normative ones, 
whereas low-identifiers do not seem to be sensitive to the type of collective action. 
Furthermore, factors such as increased subtyping of protesters or decreased perceived 
legitimacy of the action by high-identifiers in the non-normative condition fail to provide 
viable accounts of these findings. Importantly, the consistency of the pattern of findings 
across the various experiments stresses the generalizability of our predictions across countries 
and intergroup contexts.  
Experiment 3 
The main goal of Experiment 3 was to examine the viability of our model in full. To 
this end, we tested the predicted mechanism underlying differential support for normative and 
non-normative action among low and high-identifiers, namely the differential association of 
normative and non-normative collective action with outgroup gain and social image-damage 
outcomes, respectively. This experiment was also designed to provide a more conservative 
test for the effect of action on expected outcomes by using a between-participants rather than 
a within-participant design (as it was the case in Experiments 1a to 1e). In addition, we 
conducted Experiment 3 in yet another country and intergroup context. Finally, we examined 
a third alternative explanation for the effects of identification by looking at the role of 
participants’ political orientation. 




Method and Procedure 
The final sample comprised 365 White Americans (Mage=36.27, SD=11.66, 162 
women). We contacted participants contacted via the Amazon Mechanical Turk website and 
gave them $1.50 for their participation. We excluded one participant who failed to summarize 
the article and two outliers presenting studentized residuals equal or higher than |3| SD in 
analysis on support from all the analyses. 
The experimental scenario portrayed the same job hiring discrimination issue and the 
same actions as in Experiments 2b and 2c (Nnormative=185; Nnon-normative=182). We adapted the 
newspaper story to the American context with the Hispanic community as the low-status 
outgroup. The procedure was the same as before except that participants had to give their 
opinion on the hypothesized mediators, namely the expected outcomes low-status group 
campaign, as well as on the perceived legitimacy of it before answering to the support 
measure. In addition, the demographics section included measures of political orientation and 
employment status. 
Measures  
We measured ingroup identification as White American (α= .94; M=4.11, SD=1.17), 
legitimacy of the collective action (α= .97; M=4.70, SD=1.79), and support (α= .91; M=3.28, 
SD=1.30) with the same items as in the previous experiments.  
Political orientation. Participants reported on two 11-point bipolar scales to what 
extent they considered themselves to be left vs. right wing and liberal vs. conservative 
(r=.92, p<.001). The inclusion of this variable in the analyses did not affect any of the 
predicted results and will not be mentioned further.  
Employment situation. Participants indicated their employment status by selecting 
one of the following options: student (N=28), employed (N=275), unemployed (N=40), 




retired (N=11) and other (N=12, one missing). This variable did not affect the results 
reported below and will not be mentioned further.  
Expected outcomes of the low-status movement. We measured perceived likelihood 
of outgroup gain (α= .86) and social image damage (α= .87, r=-.059, p=.262) with the same 
scales as in Experiments 1c to 1e.  
Results 
Unless stated otherwise, we conducted all analyses using a multiple regression model 
with type of action (1=normative; -1=non-normative), identification (mean centered), and the 
interaction between these variables as predictors. Contrary to previous experiments, ingroup 
identification was correlated with perceived legitimacy of the collective action (r=-.152, 
p=.003). In order to control for the (potentially confounding) effect of perceived legitimacy 
while securing an unbiased estimate of the effects of our two independent variables (Yzerbyt, 
Muller, & Judd, 2004), we included legitimacy perceptions (mean-centered) and its 
interactions with our independent variables in the analyses.  
Support for the outgroup’s collective action. A regression analysis on support 
showed no effect of type of action, B=.017, CI [-..068; .103], t(357)=.40, p<.690, and a 
negative effect of ingroup identification, B=-.168, CI [-.242; -.095], t(357)=-4.49, p<.001. 
This effect was qualified by the predicted type of action by identification interaction, B=.078, 
CI [.004; .152], t(357)=2.07, p=.0396. In addition, we found a main effect of perceived 
legitimacy of the collective action, B=.550, CI [.502; .599], t(357)=22.27, p<.001. 
Unexpectedly, this effect was qualified by an identification by legitimacy interaction, B=-
.045, CI [-.084; -.006], t(357)=-2.26, p=.025. Probing this interaction simply revealed that 
legitimacy was a stronger predictor of support among low-identifiers than among high-
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identifiers (B=.603, CI [.534; .671], t(357)=17.20, p<.001; (B=.500, CI [.437; .563], t=15.70, 
p<.001, respectively). Importantly, however, both the legitimacy by type of action interaction 
and the three-way interaction between identification, type of action and legitimacy were far 
from significance (p=.806 and p=.704, respectively). We therefore conducted the remainder 
of analyses without these two predictors. 
 The critical type of action by identification interaction again revealed that 
identification had a negative effect on support in the non-normative condition (B=-.243, CI [-
.347; -.139], t(359)=-4.59, p<.001) whereas this effect was weaker in the normative condition 
(B=-.092, CI [-.194; .010], t(359)=-1.77, p=.077). Looking at the data differently, high-
identifiers tended to support more the normative relative to the non-normative action 
(B=.103, CI [-.016; .222] t(359)=1.71, p=.089) whereas low-identifiers were not affected by 
the type of low-status collective action (B=-.073, CI [-.193; .047], t(359)=-1.20, p=.230). 
These results fully replicate the previous findings.   
Expected outcomes of outgroup’s collective action. To recap, we propose that: 1) 
normative and non-normative actions trigger differential inferences concerning the outcomes 
of the collective actions (outgroup-gain vs. social image-damage), independently of 
participants’ level of ingroup identification. Experiments 1a to 1e provided support for these 
two assumptions in within-participant designs. In the present experiment, we measured 
expected outcomes in a between-participants design. As before, we computed a difference 
score by subtracting expected outgroup gain from social image-damage. This score represents 
perceptions of the prevalence of outgroup-gain relative to social image-damage and 
corresponds to our predicted mediator for the different patterns of support for normative 
versus non-normative action among high and low identifiers.  
We ran regression analyses on this score using the same predictors as in the reported 
analyses on support, that is, ingroup identification, type of action, their interaction along with 




legitimacy and its interaction with identification. Indeed, this model was the most 
parsimonious across outcomes (i.e. mediator and dependent variable). 
As before, the analysis of the first predicted path between the independent variable, 
that is, type of low-status action (coded -1 for non-normative and 1 for normative), and the 
hypothesized mediator (i.e., perceived outcomes), revealed the presence of a main effect of 
type of action in the predicted direction (B=.189, CI [.024; .353], t(359)=2.26, p=.025; 
Mnormative= .345, SE= .118, Mnon-normative= -.003, SE=.119). In addition, we found main effects 
of identification (B=-.243, CI [-.386; -.101], t(359)=-3.356, p=.001) and legitimacy (B=.338, 
CI [.244; .431], t(359)=7.09, p<.001,). Again, and as predicted, identification did not 
moderate the effect of type of action (B=.088, CI [-.054; .230], t(359)=1.22, p=.223). 
Expected outcomes of collective action as the underlying mechanism – mediated 
moderation. We argue that the observed effects of ingroup identification on support are due 
a differential sensitivity of high and low identifiers to the expected outcomes of normative 
and non-normative collective action. Specifically, whereas high-identifiers should be 
especially reluctant to support actions perceived as more likely to damage the ingroup’s social 
image than to improve the outgroup’s position, low identifiers should not be especially 
sensitive to the type of outgroup collective action. Importantly, we hypothesize that it is 
differential sensitivity and not different perceptions of the two types of actions that underlie 
the interactive effect of identification and type of action on support. We should therefore 
observe a mediated moderation (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) in which the moderator (i.e., 
identification) affects the link between the mediator (i.e., expected outcomes of the collective 
action) and the dependent variable (i.e., support for the low-status collective action). 
According to Muller and colleagues (2005), “for mediated moderation, there is overall 
moderation, produced by the mediating process, and when this process is controlled for the 
residual moderation of the treatment effect is reduced” (p. 856). 




The analyses reported above already provided support 1) for the moderation of the 
overall effect, namely, the interaction between identification and type of action on support, 
and 2) for the link between the independent variable and the proposed mediator, namely, the 
effect of type of action on expected outcomes. The last step requires testing a full mediated 
moderation model on support for collective action showing 1) a decrease in the interaction 
once the proposed mediator is included in the equation as well as, 2) ascertaining the 
significance of the interaction between identification and expected outcomes. To do so, we 
added the difference score of expected outcomes as well as its interaction with identification 
to the model that included type of action, identification, and their interaction as predictors of 
support of outgroup’s collective action. 
Results showed a main effect of expected outcomes (B=.057, CI [.005; .110], 
t(359)=2.14, p=.033,). More importantly, we also found the predicted expected outcomes by 
identification interaction (B=.046, CI [.007; .085, t(359)=2.30, p=.022,]). Supporting our 
process hypothesis, the type of action x identification interaction was no longer significant, 
B=.056, CI [-.018; .129], t(359)=1.49, p=.136). Consistent with our hypotheses, bootstrap 
CIs using Hayes’ Process Macro Model 59 (2013) confirmed that the indirect effect of type 
of action on support via expected outcomes was significant for high-identifiers (indirect 
effect =.032, CI [.003; .072]) but not for low-identifiers (indirect effect=.00, CI [-.011; .012]). 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 provided support for our hypothesized model in yet another intergroup 
context. We replicated the interaction between identification and type of collective action on 
support (Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c) as well as the effect of type of action on expected 
outcomes of collective action (Experiments 1a to 1e). This effect emerged in a between-
participants design.  




Differential expectations concerning collective action outcomes (i.e., outgroup gain 
vs. social image-damage) interacted with ingroup identification in predicting support for 
collective action among high-status group members. Specifically, the indirect effect of type 
of action on support through expected outcomes was only significant for highly identified 
individuals. These members (compared to low-identifiers) supported less collective action 
that was perceived as more likely to damage to their ingroup’s social image than to lead to 
outgroup gain (i.e., non-normative action).  
One of the main goals of the present research was to explore the relative impact of 
expected consequences of normative and non-normative collective action. However, one of 
the other novel aspects of the present research is the analysis of collective action as 
potentially damaging the social image of the high-status (perpetrator) group. As a final step, 
we therefore addressed the specific impact of social image-damage on support for low-status 
collective action among high-status groups. In order to do so, we conducted a last experiment 
in which we directly manipulated the extent to which the collective action negatively affected 
the ingroup’s social image.  
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 aimed to conceptually replicate the effects of non-normative action by 
focusing on the extent to which the low-status outgroup collective action damaged the 
ingroup’s social image. High-identifiers’ decreased support for non-normative action should 
be particularly linked to these members’ concern with the ingroup’s image. Indeed, high-
identifiers have been shown to be more sensitive to this type of threat than their low 
identified counterparts (e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Instead of manipulating the type of action (as 
before), we varied the extent to which the collective action campaign had allegedly attracted 
negative attention to the ingroup’s illegitimate domination (i.e., the international visibility of 




the collective action campaign). In addition to providing a deeper analysis of support as 
depending on the social image-damage potential of collective action, this strategy constitutes 
a more conservative test of our model because it prevents participants from potentially 
contrasting outgroup gain and social image-damage outcomes.  
Another potential limitation of previous experiments concerns the self-report nature of 
the support measure. We therefore decided to add two indirect measures of support. The first 
refers to allocation of resources to the low-status outgroup’s cause as well as to other 
disadvantaged minorities. This measure provides participants with the opportunity to “be 
legitimately concerned” with other causes and for a justification for denial of support to the 
critical protesting outgroup. The second is a behavioral measure designed to capture support 
intentions. Building on this sophisticated index of support offers a way to reduce 
measurement error and improve the robustness of findings.     
 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 171 participants from the United Kingdom 
through the Crowdflower website. Each participant received $0.50 as compensation. The 
study was presented as surveying people’s opinions about social movements and, more 
specifically, about a recent immigration campaign. The experiment consisted in a 2 
(international visibility of collective action: High vs. Low) by ingroup identification design. 
Participants had to read and summarize one of two articles allegedly published by a popular 
American newspaper. We excluded 13 participants who failed to perform this task correctly 
(i.e., they either did not write anything or wrote about something unrelated to the topic) and 
one participant with studentized residuals higher than |2.5| SD in two of the four indexes of 
support from analyses on all dependent variables. The final sample thus consisted of 157 




participants (Mage=36.06, SD=11.71; 85 women; Nhigh international visibility=80, Nlow international 
visibility=77).   
Procedure 
After giving their consent, participants filled the ingroup identification scale with 
British people and were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.  
Manipulation of damage to ingroup’s social image. In order to manipulate the 
extent to which the collective action could damage the ingroup’s social image, we 
manipulated the international visibility of the collective action campaign. We did so by 
varying both the headline of the newspaper article and some elements in the text. In the high 
international visibility condition, the headline read: “Have British people become racist? The 
eyes of the world turn to the UK”. In the low international visibility condition, the second 
part of the headline was omitted. In addition, embedded in the text was some information 
about the impact of the campaign on the media. In the high international visibility condition, 
participants learned that: the collective action campaign had received “substantial attention”, 
“the most popular newspapers of almost every European country” had mentioned the 
campaign in their headlines, the campaign posts had been shared “more than 500,000 times 
on social media and had “received thousands of views” (italics added). In the low 
international visibility condition, the terms in italics were replaced by: “some”, “several 
specialized journals in some European countries”, “500” and “hundreds”, respectively. The 
remainder of the article was the same in both conditions and ostensibly described a collective 
action campaign called “UK welcomes Syrian refugees”. The campaign was initiated by a 
group of war refugees recently hosted by other European countries with the goal to denounce 
the treatment received by refugees in the UK. The article went on citing the 1951 Convention 
on the Status of Refugees and declarations of a United Nations spokesperson condemning the 
actions of the UK. In addition, the text mentioned that “no fewer than 350 individuals have 




been denied access to the UK, amongst whom a high number of families with children”. This 
information helped prevent participants from spontaneously assuming that the problem 
affected more people in the high compared to the low international visibility condition. After 
they had summarized the newspaper article, participants answered our dependent measures, 
were debriefed, thanked, and given a code to obtain the financial compensation for their 
participation.  
Measures  
Ingroup identification. We again used the Leach and colleagues’ (2008) scale to 
measure identification, this time assessing identification as British (α=.97; M=4.77, 
SD=1.33). 
Perceived social image-damage. This variable was measured with the same six items 
used in Experiments 1c to 1e and 3 (α=.95; M=4.37, SD=1.50). 
Support for the (low status) outgroup’s action. In addition to the self-report 
measure used before, we added a more indirect measure of support in the form of the 
allocation of resources as well as a behavioral measure of support (see Appendix C).    
 Self-reported intentions to support. We used the same 11 items as before to measure 
self-reported support (α=.96; M=3.80, SD=1.68). 
 Allocation of resources. As an introduction to this measure participants read: “As you 
probably know, every year the government needs to establish a general budget for national 
emergencies. Once this general budget is determined, these funds need to be allocated to 
different sectors. Below we present you the top 4 ones. Please slide each one of the bars to 
express your opinion on how one should distribute the budget. Keep in mind that, in total, 
you are asked to distribute 100% of the emergency budget.” The four sectors presented were 
refugees (the critical one), homeless, victims of natural disasters, and victims of epidemics 




(fillers). None of the filler sectors was affected by our predictors or by their interaction 
(lowest p=.329).  
 Behavior. At the end of the questionnaire, participants could provide their email 
address in order to receive a link to sign a petition supporting the “UK welcomes refugees” 
campaign. They were reassured of the fact that there was no way to link the email to their 
individual responses and that its only use was to circulate the petition.    
Political orientation. Given the political divide around the refugee issue at the time 
of the experiment, we controlled for political orientation. Participants reported their political 
orientation using a slider on a scale from 0 (left) to 100 (right-wing; M=43.23, SD=23.45). 
Alternative accounts. We measured the importance of the issue and the quality of the 
newspaper article to ensure that the international visibility manipulation did not trigger 
heuristics related to these aspects. For example, the problem could appear more important in 
the high international visibility condition than in the low international visibility one or an 
article portraying widely reported phenomena could appear better than one focusing on a less 
attention-grabbing issue. Finally, as in the previous studies, we measured the legitimacy of 
the collective action movement. We conducted analyses to check whether our independent 
variables affected these variables, as all of them could potentially constitute alternative 
explanations for results.  
Importance of the issue. This variable was measured with 3 items on a 7-point scale. 
Participants indicated to what extent the issue portrayed in the article was “worthy to 
consider in the public discourse”/“political arena” and “important” (α=.94; M=4.97, 
SD=1.66).   
Quality of the newspaper article. Seven items referred to the quality of the article 
(e.g., “The article is easy to understand”, “This is article is boring”; α=.89; M=4.53, 
SD=1.32).  




Legitimacy of the collective action movement. This variable was measured with the 
same 4 items used in previous experiments along with a new one (“appropriate”, α=.97; 
M=4.41, SD=1.84). 
Results 
All the interactions involving our predictors on the alternative accounts mentioned 
above were non-significant (lowest p= .294). These alternative accounts will therefore not be 
mentioned further (see Supplemental materials S4). 
Perceived social image-damage. As stated above, we predicted that the collective 
action would be perceived as more likely to damage the ingroup’s social image in the high 
international visibility condition compared to the low international visibility one. This should 
translate into a main effect of condition. Despite showing the predicted trend, this effect did 
not reach significance (B=.168, CI [-.068; .404], t(154)=1.41, p=.162). It is possible that our 
international visibility manipulation led participants to deny the social-image threat in order 
to deal with it. Indeed, denial of threat is often a way to deal with it and this should be 
especially the case in more blatant self-report measures (Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; 
Teixeira, Demoulin, & Yzerbyt, 2013). In order to (partly) address this issue, we conducted a 
post-hoc experiment on a sample that would not be sensitive to this specific social-image 
threat (Americans). We asked participants to evaluate the same experimental material used 
here. The results showed that in the high visibility condition the action was perceived as more 
likely to damage the social-image of the targeted group (i.e., British people) than in the low 
visibility condition. This validates our manipulation and suggests that the absence of 
significant results concerning the manipulation-check among participants belonging to the 
advantaged ingroup might be due to denial of threat (see Supplemental material S5 for a 
detailed explanation of methods and results).  




Support for the (low status) outgroup’s action. Unless stated otherwise, we 
conducted all multiple regression analyses with identification (centered), international 
visibility (coded 1 for high and -1 for low) and their interaction as predictors. As before, we 
followed Yzerbyt and colleagues’ (2004) recommendations regarding the use of covariates. 
Because political orientation was not only systematically correlated with our dependent 
variables and controls but also with ingroup identification (r=.162, p=.042), our model 
included this variable and its interactions with our independent variables.  
In order to examine the predicted effects on support, we first conducted a multivariate 
analysis of variance with the four support indices as dependent variables (i.e., attitudes, 
behavioral intentions, resource allocation, and behavior). This procedure provides a more 
powerful test of our hypotheses by reducing measurement error. In addition, because the four 
indicators are part of the same latent variable (i.e., support) this approach seemed the most 
appropriate.  
Analyses showed the predicted international visibility by identification interaction, F 
(7, 149) = 3.01, p=.020, η2=.076,7, as well as a main effect of political orientation, F (7, 149) 
=7.73, p<.001, η2=.175. No other effects reached significance (lowest p=.249, see 
Supplemental material S6 for the full model). We therefore conducted the remainder of the 
analyses excluding the interaction between political orientation and our independent 
variables. To probe the critical interaction, we standardized the scores of the support indexes 
                                                          
7
 We realize that this analytical option implies a trade-off between robustness of hypotheses testing 
and a potential violation of the normality assumption regarding our (dichotomous) behavioral 
dependent variable. We therefore additionally conducted a logistic regression analysis on the 
behavioral data. This analysis yielded the same results as the MANOVA, namely, a negative effect of 
political orientation (B=-.038, Wald = 12.34, p<.001) as well as the predicted international visibility 
by identification interaction (B=-.396, Wald=5.67, p=.017). 




and created a composite score of support. We then proceeded with regression analyses 
following the same procedure as above. These changes did not affect the critical interaction, 
(B=-.123, CI [-.206; -.039], t(152)= -2.91, p=.004 (see Figure 4). 
As predicted, in the high international visibility condition identification had a negative 
effect on support (B=-.151, CI [-.269; -.034], t(152)=-2.55, p=.012). This effect was not 
significant in the low international visibility condition (B=.094, CI [-.025; .213], t(152)=1.57, 
p=.119). Furthermore, high identifiers supported the low-status outgroup less in the high 
compared to the low international visibility condition (B=-.167, CI [-.323; -.012], t(152)=-




Figure 4. Support for protesting low-status outgroup among high-status group members as a 
function of the international visibility of the outgroup’s collective action and the level of 
ingroup identification. The support measure represents the aggregated standardized score of 
self-reported support, resources allocated to the outgroup and behavioral support (grey areas 
around the slopes represent standard errors).   
 
 





In this last experiment, we manipulated the international visibility of collective action and 
tested more directly the undermining role of social image concerns on support among high-
identifiers. Our results conceptually replicated previous experiments across different support 
measures and in yet another intergroup context, in this case, refugees in the UK. When the 
collective action attracted worldwide attention to the inequality perpetrated by the ingroup, 
compared to when it went relatively unnoticed, high-identifiers supported it less. We found a 
reversal of this pattern among low-identifiers who supported the outgroup more in the high 
international visibility condition than in the low international visibility one. We will return to 
this issue later. 
Importantly, perceived legitimacy, importance of the issue, quality of the newspaper or 
political orientation fail to account for the effects found on support. A difference between this 
experiment and the previous ones is that here we used a more proximal manipulation of 
social image-damage (i.e., it did not need to be inferred from the type of collective action). 
Indeed, compared to non-normative actions, the high international visibility manipulation 
used in this experiment left less room for doubt about the consequences of the collective 
action. In other words, this last experiment was more of a “harm-already-done” situation than 
the previous ones.  
General Discussion 
Our central thesis is that the type of social change strategy enacted by low-status 
groups (i.e., normative vs. non-normative actions) shapes support for collective action among 
high-status group members varying in identification with the ingroup. In addition, we 
proposed that the effects of identification are due to differential sensitivity among high and 
low identifiers to the expected outcomes of normative and non-normative actions. Given the 
absence of literature on this issue, it seemed especially important to generalize results across 




intergroup contexts. Specifically, we tested our main hypotheses across five samples in four 
countries using three different intergroup comparison contexts (Experiments 2a to 4).  
Three experiments (2a to 2c) provided evidence for the predicted interaction in two 
intergroup contexts and two countries. High-identifiers with high-status groups supported 
non-normative collective action less than low-identifiers whereas no differences emerged for 
normative actions. Our data reveal that perceived differences in perceived legitimacy of the 
actions or subtyping of protesters fail to account for this effect.  
Five experiments (1a to 1e) tested the predicted effect of type of low-status action (i.e. 
our independent variable) on perceived outcomes of the action (i.e., the proposed mediator). 
Participants perceived normative action as more likely to reduce intergroup inequality than to 
damage the high-status group’s social image whereas they saw non-normative action as more 
likely to tarnish the high-status group’s reputation than actually reduce inequality. 
Perceptions of outcomes of collective action were relatively consensual among people as this 
pattern replicated across relatively minimal “empty” contexts (Experiments 1a and 1c) and 
more meaningful ones (Experiments 1b, 1d and 1e) and did not differ for low and high 
identifiers advantaged group members (Experiments 1b and 3).  
In addition, a subset of this first package of experiments examined why normative and 
non-normative protest are perceived as having asymmetrical outcomes regarding inequality 
reduction and social image damage to the advantaged group (Experiments 1c to 1e). This is 
the first research to examine how various dimensions on which normative and non-normative 
protest co-vary relate to perceptions of these actions, offering a better understanding of the 
mechanisms by which different types of collective action impact audiences. Results showed 
that differences in perceptions of outgroup gain and social image damage, resulting from 
normative and non-normative protest, are due to two specific aspects, namely: the extent to 
which the action deviates from ‘normative’ protest (at the descriptive and prescriptive levels), 




and the extent to which the protesters are perceived as blaming the advantaged for the 
inequality. Again, these perceptions were consensual among involved (Experiments 1d and 
1e) and non-involved perceivers (Experiment 1c). Non-relevant aspects for perceptions of 
outcomes of collective action included perceived extremity, legality, harm, extremity of 
protesters, perceived anger from protesters, and perceived perceptions of protesters being 
treated unfairly.       
Experiment 3 provided support for our proposed mediated moderation model and 
ruled out a third alternative explanation (i.e., political orientation). The heightened 
association of non-normative action with social image-damage relative to outgroup-gain 
outcomes (compared to normative action) explained differences in support among high and 
low identifiers. Finally, Experiment 4 directly manipulated that aspect of the mediator judged 
to be especially novel for research on support for collective action: the extent to which the 
collective action damaged the high-status ingroup’s social image. In line with predictions, 
high-identifiers in the more image damaging condition (the one in which the outgroup’s 
collective action was presented as highly visible, and thus shaming, worldwide) supported the 
action less than the ones in the less damaging condition.  
The Experience of Advantage in the Face of Collective Action 
This article is to our knowledge the first to examine high status groups’ support for collective 
action when actually confronted with it. The limited research that has measured collective 
action tendencies among high-status group members has done so in the absence of concrete 
collective protest, and is mainly correlational (e.g., Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Mallett, Huntsinger, 
Sinclair, & Swim, 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). Our results 
contrast with this earlier work. Broadly speaking, the existing research found evidence for 
what could be referred as an “empathy-based” account of support for social change. Van 
Zomeren and colleagues (2010) found identification with the low-status outgroup but not 




with the ingroup to increase support for collective action. In the same vein, Iyer and Ryan 
(2009) found perceived illegitimacy and pervasiveness of inequality to predict positively 
men’s support for collective action in support of gender equality, and Mallet and colleagues 
(Studies 1 and 2, 2008) found a positive association between perspective-taking and 
collective action on behalf of a low-status outgroup. In a nutshell, factors making inequality 
more serious and less justifiable and leading high-status individuals to see the situation from 
the disadvantaged group’s perspective increased support for social change directed action.  
Our findings are more in line with a threat-based account of support (or lack thereof). 
For example, we found identification with the ingroup negatively to predict support for non-
normative collective action over and above the positive effect of legitimacy of the protest. 
This contrasts with the empathy-based research findings. Furthermore, we also found this 
negative effect of identification when the collective action attracted worldwide attention for 
the wrongdoings of the ingroup. These results are in line and extend previous research 
showing that concern about the condemnation of the ingroup for wrong-doings positively 
predicts self-defensive responses and negatively predicts pro-social ones (Gausel, Leach, 
Vignoles, & Brown, 2012).  
One explanation for inconsistencies between our findings and previous research might 
be that, by focusing on situations in which actual collective action unfolds, we maximized the 
impact of threats to status and values of the ingroup compared to research looking at 
collective action intentions “in principle” in the absence of collective action movements or 
concrete actions.  In this sense, the mere presence of collective action in society may 
qualitatively change high-status groups’ psychological responses to inequality. Collective 
protest increases the perceived illegitimacy of inequality among sympathizers (Thomas & 
Louis, 2014) and is, by definition, designed to raise awareness in audiences for the need to 
change the current state-of-affairs (Haslam & Reicher, 2012). As such, the presence of 




collective protest is not only likely to increase the perceived likelihood of social change, and 
therefore a loss of status for high-status groups, but it also attracts attention to the undeserved 
privileges of high-status groups, potentially damaging their image (Iyer & Leach, 2009; 
Lowery, Chow, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2012). This idea is also in line with findings showing 
increased physiological threat responses among high-status groups discussing change in 
status quo in intergroup contexts (Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sintemaartensdijk, 2009).  
In sum, measuring high-status groups’ reactions to social inequality in the presence of 
collective protest may trigger very different reactions compared to cases where protest 
remains a mere possibility, a situation that is prone to more politically correct or more 
normative answers. A similar point has been made by Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2007) who 
distinguished between the abstract goal of systemic compensation to structurally 
disadvantaged groups and the willingness to undertake specific actions to achieve it among 
advantaged groups. The authors’ point was that determinants of pursuit of abstract goals are 
not necessarily the same as determinants of willingness to engage in specific behaviors aimed 
at bringing these goals about (see also, Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Jackman & Crane, 1986).  
Taking these issues into account, empirical analyses of support for social change 
among high-status groups should therefore simultaneously consider the actual willingness to 
act (and actual behavior when possible, see Experiment 4) and the specificity of the events 
that embody social change attempts. In this sense, low-status groups are not without influence 
and shape the context in which high-status groups react to privilege by the very actions they 
choose to initiate in order to challenge structural inequality.  
Speaking to the role of the low-status group’s choice of protest strategy in 
determining support, normative and non-normative actions were associated with different 
outcomes (Experiments 1a, 1b and 3) and these expected outcomes differently predicted 
support among low and high identifiers. Non-normative collective action was least supported 




by high-identifiers because it was perceived as tainting the high-status ingroup social image 
(Experiments 3 and 4). These findings emerged independently of the strong effects of 
perceived legitimacy of collective action and political orientation.  
A key goal of the present research was to uncover psychological mechanisms 
explaining support for different types of action. Among high-identifiers, support was mainly 
determined by the extent to which collective action was perceived as likely to damage the 
image of the advantaged group relative to its potential to actually reduce inequality and 
therefore decrease privilege of the high-status ingroup. This is both counterintuitive and 
consequential. Although one might assume that collective action is mostly threatening to the 
advantaged group’s interests (status or resources), our data show that this is not necessarily 
the case. These findings nicely dovetail with research on the needs model of reconciliation 
and, more specifically, with the idea that, in situations of structural inequality, high-status 
groups are more sensitive to threats to their moral stance than to competence ones (Nadler & 
Shnabel, 2015).   
Implications for the Effectiveness of Low-Status Collective Action  
Based on the current findings one might conclude that low-status groups with 
grievances should always follow the “Martin Luther King” normative courses of action in 
order to gather support for their cause. But, considering the ‘big picture’, is a more 
provocative Malcom X approach necessarily less effective in bringing about social change? 
Three aspects are worth mentioning here.  
First, the perceived outcomes of different actions did not vary as a function of the 
level of identification of the perceiver (Experiments 1b and 3) and emerged even in the 
absence of a clear intergroup context (Experiments 1a and 1c). This suggests a consensus 
about the potential of non-normative actions, relative to normative ones, in communicating 
illegitimate domination and questioning the broader social order. Yes, this aspect decreased 




support among high-identifiers with the high-status group, but not among low-identifiers. 
Indeed, even if the findings were only significant in the last experiment (in which the damage 
to the ingroup’s social image was more directly manipulated), low-identifiers always 
exhibited the opposite pattern, that is, they had a relatively positive reaction to non-normative 
actions.  
Secondly, our research suggests that non-normative action increases the international 
visibility and awareness of unfairness, and this might even be more the case if the high-status 
group reacts to it in antagonistic ways. In this respect, it is worth considering that 
effectiveness of collective action not only depends on support from the advantaged. For 
example, a consequence of increased perceptions of unfairness is an increase in support for 
collective action among third parties such as sympathizers (Thomas & Louis, 2014) or 
bystanders (Saab et al., 2015) but also an increase of intra-group solidarity among low-status 
group members themselves (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). One can imagine that 
advantaged groups reacting negatively to non-normative protest, actually reinforces 
perceptions of illegitimacy of inequality among these other audiences. Sympathizers, 
bystanders or third parties are then more likely to voice their support for inequality reduction 
and increase pressures among the advantaged to comply with social change.  
So, assuming that non-normative action can be effective in gathering support among 
some audiences, can its negative effects among high-identifiers be tempered? It is possible 
that, by attracting attention to the high-status group responsibility for inequality, non-
normative action might “naturally” activate a self-focus among high-status groups. High-
identifiers, being more attached to the positive value of the ingroup might respond with more 
resistance to this threat than low identifiers (for a similar discussion, see Doosje et al., 1998). 
If this is indeed the case, it is possible to minimize the negative effects of non-normative 
action on support among the advantaged by deliberately focusing collective action on the 




disadvantaged group’s position. This idea is in line with research by Lowery and colleagues 
showing the positive impact of framing racial inequality as “black disadvantage” instead of 
“white privilege” on support for affirmative action, and this especially among highly-
identified whites (Lowery, et al., 2006; see also Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002). 
A third important aspect concerning actual effectiveness of (non)normative protest 
that remains to be addressed brings us back to our initial example of MLK and Malcom X. 
As our iconic comparison nicely illustrates, normative and non-normative protest often occur 
in parallel. There are often more and less ‘radical’ factions speaking for the same, broadly 
conceived, disadvantaged group. The mere existence of one (non)normative faction is very 
likely to impact acceptability of the other. Competing hypotheses co-exist in this respect. For 
example, normative protest may trigger more support among the advantaged if it occurs 
alongside non-normative protest because of fear of escalation of conflict. Indeed, there is a 
history of radical liberation struggles pushing the ones in power towards the more moderate 
(in their eyes “least worst”) alternative. This idea is line with research showing that 
advantaged groups prefer to discuss commonalities compared to differences with outgroup 
members (Saguy et al., 2009). However, it can also be that the presence of non-normative 
protest (or protesters) attracts more attention and serves as rhetorical “proof” among the 
advantaged for dismissal of the low-status demands. An example of this is the recent “Yellow 
Vests” movement in France or the independence movement of Catalunya in Spain. In both 
cases, members of the protesting group had to publicly disavow their radical elements 
because the prevailing public (and advantaged) discourse was dismissing them as a minority 
of provocateurs. We did not find evidence for more subtyping for non-normative protesters, 
which speaks to this analysis, but we did not examine contexts in which normative and non-
normative protest co-occur, so this scenario remains a possibility.  
Conclusion 




Collective action mostly occurs in the context of structural inequality and is very often 
initiated by disadvantaged groups. The present work aimed to advance the understanding of 
the dynamics of collective action by examining responses of high-status groups to specific 
forms of action by low-status groups. This approach has the advantage of providing a more 
complete and dialectical picture of social change dynamics. The higher potential of non-
normative action to taint the high-status group’s social image determined lack of support 
among high-identifiers. Collective action is usually conceived as a means of struggle for the 
reduction of inequality, threatening advantaged group interests. This work shows that (non-
normative) collective action might also and even mainly be perceived as a way of questioning 
the moral stance of the high-status group and be threatening precisely because of this. Taken 
together, the present findings call for a broader view of collective interests incorporating both 
resource and identity motives as determinants of the acceptability of social change actions.    
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List of Normative and Non-normative actions (Experiment 1a) 
 
1. Block the access 24/7 to buildings belonging to the majority and that symbolise 
the disadvantages suffered by the minority. (NN) 
2. Organize information sharing sessions to discuss the inequality. (N) 
3. Help to organize and take part in a strike. (N) 
4. Create fake Twitter accounts in the name of public figures from the high-status 
group conveying a negative message about the low-status group. (NN) 
5. Help to organize and participate in a demonstration. (N) 
6. Hacking websites re-directing users to sites informing them about the cause 
defended by the collective campaign. (NN) 
7. Create and distribute a petition. (N) 
8. Spray protest messages (e.g., “more equality now!”) on buildings. (NN) 
9. Create a group on Facebook defending the low-status cause. (N) 
10. Distribute flyers about the inequality in shopping areas. (N) 
11. Harm the image of people who oppose the cause of the low-status group by 
spreading negative rumours about them, for example, in social media. (NN) 
12. Get naked in public as a sign of protest. (NN) 
N=normative; NN=non-normative, according to pre-testing. 
  





Items Measuring Expected Outcomes of Low-Status Outgroup Collective Action 
(Experiments 1c to 1e) 
Imagine now the possible consequences of each type of protest. To what extent is each one 
likely to have the following consequences: (not at all likely=1; very likely=7)  
 
Outgroup gain Outcome 
 
The protesting group will get the results it wants.  
The protesting group will be successful in getting more jobs.  
The protesting group will be able to improve their situation.  
The protesting group will lose this fight. (reversed) 
The protesting group is "shooting itself in the foot." (reversed)  
The protesting group will be seen as overreacting. (reversed) 
The protesting group will be seen as having "a chip on their shoulder" because of this 
campaign. (reversed) 
Social image-damage Outcome 
The protesting group will make the advantaged group seem unfair to the rest of the world.    
The protesting group will damage the reputation of the advantaged group.   
The image of the advantaged group is going to be stained.   
People will think that the advantaged group discriminates against disadvantaged groups.    
The advantaged group will be discredited.    
People will think that the advantaged group is prejudiced.  
 
  





Items Measuring Support for Low-Status Outgroup Collective Action per Experiment 
Experiments 1d and 2a 
 
After reading the article, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1=Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree)   
 
I support women in their claims on the issue of ‘wages for housework’. 
I think women should be heard on the issue of ‘wages for housework’. 
I think women should strive to decrease the gap between women and men. 
I encourage women to fight for their rights on the issue of ‘wages for housework’. 
 
In light of your opinion regarding the cause ‘Wages for Housework’, to what extent 
would you be willing, in principle, to participate in the following actions? (Not at all 
willing to participate=1; Very much willing to participate= 7). 
 
Help creating flyers advocating women’s right to demand wages for their housework. 
Sign a petition in favor of wages for women’s unpaid work.  
Boycott work meetings happening after 4 pm. 
Block the parking card swipe machine of your company or university so that your male 
colleagues cannot get in. 
Paint the WH initials on the cars of authorities responsible for labor laws. 
Deface work material (such as hard-drives or PCs) of managers who do not support the 
‘wages for housework’ cause. 
Experiments 2b and 2c 
 
After reading the article, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1=Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree)   
 
I support North-African citizens in their claims.  
I think North-African citizens should be heard on this.  




I support the ‘same qualifications, same job’ campaign. 
I encourage North-African citizens to fight for their rights.  
I think that the situation is not that serious for North-African citizens. (reversed) 
I think that authorities should not take the demands of the ‘same qualifications, same job’ 
campaign into account. (reversed) 
 
In light of your opinion regarding the cause of the North-African citizens’ campaign group, 
to what extent would you be willing, in principle, to participate in the following actions? (Not 
at all willing to participate=1; Very much willing to participate= 7) 
 
Distribute flyers supporting the ‘same qualifications, same job’ campaign group. 
Join a demonstration supporting the ‘same qualifications, same job’ campaign group.  
Make a financial donation to the cause of the ‘same qualifications, same job’ campaign 
group.  
Publicly expose companies who practice discriminatory hiring against North-African citizens 
through social media. 
Keep watch while somebody paints the motto ‘same qualifications, same job’ on the walls of 
employment agencies.   
Experiments 1e and 3 
 
In light of your opinion regarding the cause of the Hispanic campaign group, to what extent 
do you agree with the following statements? (1=Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree) 
   
I support the Hispanic campaign group in its claims.  
I think the Hispanic campaign group should be heard on this.  
I think the Hispanic campaign group should strive for this cause.  
I encourage the Hispanic campaign group to fight for its rights.  
I think that situation is not that serious for Hispanics (reversed).  
 
In light of your opinion regarding the cause of the Hispanic campaign group, to what extent 
would you be willing, in principle, to participate in the following actions? (Not at all willing 
to participate=1; Very much willing to participate= 7) 
 




Make a financial donation to the cause of the Hispanic campaign group “same qualifications, 
same job”.  
Keep watch while somebody paints the motto ‘same qualifications, same job’ on the walls of 
employment agencies.   
Join a demonstration supporting the cause of the Hispanic campaign group ‘same 
qualifications, same job’.  
Publicly expose companies who practice discriminatory hiring through social media.  
Distribute flyers supporting the rights of the Hispanic community to demand equal access to 
the job market.  
Experiment 4 
 
After reading the article, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1=Completely disagree, 7= Completely agree)   
 
I support the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign in its claim. 
I think that the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign should be heard. 
I encourage the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign to fight for the rights of Syrian 
refugees. 
I think that authorities should not take the demands of the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ 
campaign into account. (reversed) 
I support the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign. 
 
In light of your opinion regarding the cause of the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign 
group, to what extent would you be willing, in principle, to perform in the following actions? 
 
Share links informing people of the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ actions. 
Sign a petition supporting the demands of the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign 
group. 
Express support for the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign group in posts on social 
media such as Twitter or Facebook.  
Participate in a demonstration supporting the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign.  
Display the logo of the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ campaign group on your 
car/bike/backpack.  




Participate in an information session about the ‘UK welcomes Syrian refugees’ actions and 
claims.  
 
As you probably know, every year the government needs to establish a general budget for 
national emergencies. Once this general budget is fixed, these funds need to be allocated to 
different sectors. Below we present you the top 4 ones. Please slide each one of the bars to 
express your opinion on how this budget should be distributed. Keep in mind that, in total, 
you are asked to distribute 100% of the emergency budget (it will stop when you reach this 
limit but you can also readjust allocations to reflect your preference). 
 
a) Refugees  
b) Homeless  
c) Victims of natural disasters (fires, floods, earthquakes, ...)  
d) Victims of epidemics  
 
If you would like to receive the link for the petition created by the ‘UK welcomes Syrian 
refugees’ campaign demanding the granting of asylum to the Syrian refugees, please leave 
your email below. We will just use it to circulate the petition: it will not be linked to your 
individual responses or used to contact you for any other matter (i.e. also preserving your 
anonymity). 
 
 
 
 
